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ABSTRACT

The study examined the effect on the cost of extending unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers if interstate workers reduced their migration for employment as a result of such a program. There were 50,425 migrants in 14 states who had agricultural employment earnings in more than one state during a 52-week period. Two sets of adjustments were made on workers eligible for unemployment insurance benefits on the basis of agricultural coverage if they were not already eligible by previously covered nonfarm employment: 50% reduction and 100% reduction in interstate weeks of employment. Workers whose employment histories were adjusted had as nearly as possible 50% and 100%, alternately, of their interstate employment deleted to stimulate the phenomenon under study. If deleted, a job was deleted in its entirety. Similarly, no job was deleted which made a worker ineligible for benefits. The effective reductions in interstate employment when taken over all migrant workers were 20% and 71% for the two reductions, respectively. With no changes in migratory work histories, the extension of unemployment insurance coverage to employers with one or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1,500 or more resulted in a cost rate of 4.78 for migrants separately and 2.95 for all agricultural workers taken together. This rate taken over all workers increased to 3.79 after the 50% reduction and to 6.15 after the 100% reduction. Average earnings plus benefits for migrants were $3,534. (Author/NQ)

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MIGRATION AND THE COST OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROTECTION FOR AGRICULTURAL WORKERS

Robert D. Emerson

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

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This public document was promulgated at an annual cost of $3,699.62, or 74 cents per copy to present information on the cost of extending unemployment insurance to migrant agricultural workers.

PREFACE

This study is based on a set of agricultural worker data collected under the direction of the respective state project directors of Regional Research Project NE-58 of the Northeast Agricultural Experiment Stations, in cooperation with the U. S. Department of Labor. The project directors at the time of the survey were:

#Raymond O. P. Farrish	University of Connecticut
#Joachim Elterich	University of Delaware
Leo Polopolus	University of Florida
A. Stewart Holmes	University of Maryland
Bradford Crossmon	University of Massachusetts
Edmund F. Jansen, Jr.	University of New Hampshire
George F. Luke	Rutgers University
#Ward W. Bauder	Cornell University
C. A. Bratton	Cornell University
Bernard L. Erven	Ohio State University
#James S. Holt	Pennsylvania State University
Rex H. Warland	Pennsylvania State University
David Reusink	Texas A&M University
Raymond H. Tremblay	University of Vermont

Reports discussing the impact of unemployment insurance to agriculture for each of the states in the project and for the region as a whole either are in preparation or have been released. This report is based on a project which is supplementary to the above work, looking at alternative assumptions about the effect such a program might have on migratory labor, and how these effects might influence the cost of the program.

Computer programs common to the NE-58 regional project and to the one reported upon herein were made available by Ward Bauder. Roger Rossi of the Unemployment Insurance Service, U.S. Department of Labor has provided valuable suggestions and insight throughout this study. Programming for the study, often under excruciating time constraints, was done by Michael Mara, Sheriar Irani, Gerry Roset, Jack Mace, and Robert Jewett. Computations were done through the University of Florida Computing Center.

Leo Polopolus, Galen Moses, and Stuart Monplaisir of the Food and Resource Economics Department have been most helpful throughout the project. The author wishes to acknowledge the comments of John Holt, Marvin Konyha, and Glenn Zepp on an earlier draft of this report.

#Members of Executive Committee

SUMMARY

The objective of this study is to determine the effect on the cost of extending unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers if interstate workers reduced their migration for employment as a result of such a program. An argument against such a program has been that if unemployment insurance benefits were available to migratory agricultural workers, they would choose to remain in one location and collect unemployment benefits during the off-season rather than migrate for agricultural work. No attempt has been made in this study to answer the question as to whether or not such a phenomenon would occur; the phenomenon has been assumed to have occurred and its effect on the cost of the program has been determined.

Interstate workers for this study were defined as those having employment earnings in more than one state during the 52 week period under analysis. When so defined, there were 50,425 migrants in the 14 state region[1] out of a population of 211,157 workers who had agricultural employment during the same 52 week period. Two sets of adjustments were made on migratory workers who were eligible for unemployment insurance benefits on the basis of agricultural coverage if they were not already eligible by previously covered non-farm employment: 1) 50% reduction in interstate weeks of employment, and 2) 100% reduction in interstate weeks of employment. Workers whose employment histories were adjusted had as nearly as possible 50% and 100%, alternately, of their interstate employment deleted to simulate the phenomenon under study. One particularly important constraint placed upon the reductions was that, if deleted, a job must be deleted in its entirety. Similarly, no job could be deleted which would make a worker ineligible for benefits.

The effective reductions in interstate employment when taken over all migrant workers were 20% and 71% for the two reductions, respectively. The deviations from the hypothetical reductions were a result of the constraints imposed on the deletion procedure. With no changes in migratory work histories, the extension of unemployment insurance coverage to agricultural employers with one or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more resulted in a cost rate of 4.78 for migrants separately and 2.95 for all agricultural workers taken together.[2] This rate taken over all workers increased to 3.79 after the 50% reduction and to 6.15 after the 100% reduction. It should be noted that even with 71% of the

[1]Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia.

[2]The cost rate is defined as the ratio of additional actual benefits to additional taxable earnings, multiplied by 100, resulting in a percentage.

interstate weeks of employment eliminated, the cost rate increased only by a factor of slightly more than two.

The 13,559 workers covered by the above provision who had work reductions under the 50% reduction had reductions averaging 21% of their weeks of employment. The economic loss in terms of foregone earnings net of additional unemployment benefits averaged to $409, representing 12% of their average earnings plus benefits prior to the adjustment. The 32,513 workers with reductions under the 100% reduction had reductions averaging 31% of their weeks of employment. Similarly, their economic loss averaged to $687, representing 22% of their average earnings plus benefits prior to adjustment. Average earnings plus benefits for migrants were $3,534. To be in their proper perspective, any judgments made on the change in cost rates as a result of reduced migration must include consideration of the economic losses to the worker if he does decide not to migrate. As noted at the beginning, no attempt has been made to determine whether or not the workers actually would alter their work patterns. This question is left to judgment and further research.

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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION

Agricultural workers have been summarily excluded from unemployment insurance protection at the federal level. Although states are free to include agricultural employers in the unemployment insurance program, only Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia have chosen to do so. During the late 1960's there was increased interest at the federal level to extend unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers. The last attempt by the Administration to include agricultural labor within the unemployment insurance program was in 1969. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, one result of a joint conference of the Senate and House of Representatives was to direct the Secretary of Labor to obtain more information pertinent to the extension of the program to include agricultural workers.

The data have been collected toward this end as a part of the cooperative project, NE-58, of the Northeast Agricultural Experiment Stations with funding from the U.S. Department of Labor. Data on agricultural employers and their workers were collected on a standardized basis for 15 states: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia. The data for each of these states have now been summarized and computations have been done to determine the cost of extending unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers.[1]

Unemployment Insurance Program

A clear perspective of the objectives of unemployment insurance will be useful for interpreting the results presented in this report. The Department of Labor has described the objectives of the program as follows (*13*; p. 26):[2]

> Unemployment insurance is a program — established under Federal and State Law — for income maintenance during period(s) of involuntary unemployment due to lack of work, which provides partial compensation for

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[1]Reports for each of these states have now been prepared, presenting the impact of the extension of unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers (*1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22*). A report summarizing the results for the 15 states as a region has also been prepared (*2*). A thorough discussion of the survey and further background information on unemployment insurance for agricultural workers can be found in (*2*).

[2]This was reprinted from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security, *Major Objectives of Federal Policy with Respect to the Federal State Employment Security Program*, General Administration Letter No. 305, April 25, 1955.

wage loss as a matter of right, with dignity and dispatch, to eligible individuals. It helps to maintain purchasing power and to stabilize the economy. It helps to prevent the dispersal of the employers' trained work force, the sacrifice of skills, and the breakdown of labor standards during temporary unemployment.

It is clear from this statement that the primary objective of the program is for the protection of the worker with secondary objectives of stabilization of the economy and the maintenance of a permanent work force for the employer. It is unclear, however, why a particular group of workers should be excluded from such protection if this is the primary objective.[3]

The unemployment insurance program is basically a self-supporting system. Covered employers are taxed a certain percentage of their payroll to maintain the system's fund for covering possible drains on the system's fund as a result of claims by workers whom they might lay off in the future. The unemployment experience of the employer's workers is a major factor in the determination of the tax rate. In most states this experience is reflected by charging benefits paid to an employer's account. For example, an employer with high benefit charges is given a higher tax rate than one with lower charges.[4] There is, however, a maximum tax rate that an employer can be charged.[5] Claims on the fund are made by workers who have become unemployed through no fault of their own. Opponents to the extension of unemployment insurance protection have argued that the additional claims which would be placed by agricultural workers would be larger than the additional contributions to the fund by their employers.

The Extension of Unemployment Insurance Coverage to Agriculture

No Change in Migration

The results of the analysis on the data collected indicate, however, that additional benefits which would have been paid to agricultural workers during the survey year on the basis of workers surveyed in a 14 state region ranged only from 3.0% to 3.5% of taxable agricultural earnings over a relatively wide range of employer coverage

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[3]It should be noted that agricultural workers are not the only group excluded. Depending on the particular state, others are typically domestic services in private homes and state and local governments. However, any state can elect to cover classes of workers excluded by the Federal law.

[4]Employers are given a period of time in which to establish an "experience rating." During this initial period, the employer is taxed at a given rate for new entrants. Both the rate and the length of time vary by state.

[5]The maximum tax rate is determined by each state's laws and hence varies across states. See (*26*) for the rates in specific states.

criteria.[6] These rates indicate that the extension of unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers would not necessarily be a net drain on the fund. Since most maximum tax rates exceed these rates, employer contributions could cover the withdrawals.[7] However, a remaining question is to determine what happens to the ratio of benefits to taxable earnings if workers who migrated for work prior to the program choose to collect unemployment benefits now rather than migrate for work. The effort reported upon herein is an attempt to answer this question.

The results presented in this report are based on 14 of the above named 15 states for which employer and worker data have been collected. Texas is not included in the state comparisons or in the 14 state region. Although the data are available and similar calculations have been done for Texas, the standardized procedures used in the 14 other states are not appropriate for the Texas sample. Due to time constraints, Texas workers were sampled in some areas of the state during the off-peak season, thus presenting problems peculiar to the standardized procedures for the other states. Although work is in progress to adjust for this problem (*14*), a procedure compatible with the other 14 states was not available for use in the present study.

Florida is also unique to the other states in the region. Whereas interviewing was done during the summer of 1970 for all states except Florida and Texas, Florida interviewed from mid-November 1970 through February 1971. Although this resulted from the late entry of Florida into the project, it is the peak season in Florida agriculture and hence its employment as well. The difficulty presented in terms of developing population estimates of workers and their earnings is that the universe from which the Florida sample was drawn may be a part of the universe for the Northeastern states. Although there were no workers who were actually interviewed both in Florida and in a Northeastern state, it is possible that a worker interviewed in Florida was a worker in a Northeastern state at the time when their workers were interviewed. In fact, as will be clear later in the illustrations of labor mobility, there were large numbers of workers encountered in Florida who had worked in Northeastern states during the analysis year. Similarly there is the reverse transfer. Although the estimates of the workers for each of the states separately would be satisfactory, the sum over the states might involve some double-counting, resulting

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[6]The 14 state region consists of the previously mentioned 15 states excluding Texas. Texas is not included in regional summaries due to sampling difficulties which present problems of comparability with the other states being considered.

[7]The relation of benefits to taxable earnings will be referred to as a percentage rate throughout the report. It is defined as the ratio of additional benefits to taxable agricultural earnings, multiplied by 100.

in an over-estimate for the region. The corresponding items such as earnings would be affected similarly.

The important question, of course, is how this problem might be expected to influence the results of the study. The major impact would be an over representation of migrants in the sample, resulting in population estimates of respective variables having a larger migratory component than in fact was the case. As will become clear when migratory workers are contrasted to all workers, the effect would be to *over-estimate* increases in the cost rates for all workers after the work reductions are made. This follows from the characteristics of migrants and the possibility that migrants represent too high a proportion of all workers in the sample.

Both regional and state estimates will be referred to throughout the report. Regional estimates refer to a summation of the respective items for the 14 states considered. Although state estimates are referred to occasionally in the text, most state tables have been deferred to the Appendix. When referring to persons in either state or region estimates, the base is the persons interviewed in the respective area. When referring to dollars in either state or region estimates, there are two possible ways of arriving at these. One is simply a sum of all items based on the workers interviewed in the geographic area regardless of whether or not their work was within that area. The second alternative for regional estimates is including only dollar items which refer to work done within the region. For example, if a worker had 26 weeks of work in Florida and 26 weeks of work in Alabama, only the earnings from the Florida work would be included in the regional estimates since Alabama is not in the region. The second alternative for state estimates, although similar to the regional procedure, requires further clarification. Again, if the worker in the above example were from the Florida worker sample, only his 26 weeks of Florida earnings would be included in the estimate of Florida earnings. However, Florida earnings of workers from the other 13 states are also included in the Florida earnings.

The effects of extending unemployment insurance coverage to agricultural employers over alternative coverage criteria are summarized in Table 1 for the 14 state region. Reading down the table, the coverage criteria include fewer employers. As a result, fewer workers are covered by the less inclusive criteria. Similarly, beneficiaries, benefits, and earnings decrease for the less inclusive criteria. Column six of the table is the item of most interest in the consideration of the extension of the program to protect agricultural workers. Although there is nearly a 50% reduction in the number of workers covered under the least inclusive criterion, 8 or more workers in 26 or more weeks, there is very little variation in the ratios of additional actual benefits to taxable agricultural earnings. The rates indicate that from 3.0% to 3.3% of taxable agricultural earnings would have been required to pay benefit claims of workers as determined from their work

Table 1. — Effect of alternative employer coverage criteria on 14 state region agricultural workers.[a]

Employer coverage provision[b]	(1) Workers covered	(2) Potential beneficiaries[c]	(3) Actual beneficiaries[d]	(4) Additional actual benefits[e]	(5) Additional taxable earnings[f]	(6) (4) ÷ (5) x 100
				Million dollars		
1 in 1	211,157 (100.0)	164,411 (77.9)	48,076 (22.8)	14.15 (100.0)	478.29 (100.0)	2.96
1 in 20 or $1500 H.Q. payroll	20[illegible],091 (96.7)	161,292 (76.4)	47,420 (22.4)	13.85 (97.9)	468.85 (98.0)	2.95
4 in 20 or $5000 H.Q. payroll	156,324 (74.0)	134,550 (63.7)	42,647 (20.2)	12.45 (88.0)	377.13 (78.8)	3.30
4 in 20	143,357 (67.9)	127,690 (60.5)	39,346 (18.6)	11.19 (79.1)	355.52 (74.3)	3.15
8 in 26	111,117 (52.6)	106,326 (50.4)	34,183 (16.2)	9.08 (64.2)	280.76 (58.7)	3.23

[a] The items immediately below each entry of columns (1)-(3) are the percentages of workers covered under the 1 in 1 provision. The items below each entry of columns (4) and (5) are percentages of the respective entries under the 1 in 1 provision.

[b] The coverage provisions in this and subsequent tables are to be read as, for example, the second provision, one or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.

[c] Included are 23,826 workers who were potential beneficiaries by covered non-farm work.

[d] Included are 8,351 workers who were actual beneficiaries without agricultural coverage.

[e] This includes additional actual benefits beyond actual benefits without agricultural coverage, based on work done within the 14 state region.

[f] Included are only those earnings within the 14 state region which would be taxable as a result of agricultural coverage.

histories. Benefits and earnings are in this case based on work done within the region.[8]

Although the rates cited above are probably the single most important item, the other information in the table is not to be overlooked. If all workers were covered (the 1 in 1 provision), 77.9% would qualify as potential beneficiaries. Although the eligibility requirements vary across states, typically requiring some combination of minimum earnings and weeks of work for a covered employer, some degree of attachment to the labor force is indicated. Of those who qualify as potential beneficiaries under each provision, 29% to 32% had compensable periods of unemployment such that they would have been actual beneficiaries. Again under full coverage, $478 million would be taxable as a result of the extension of unemployment insurance coverage to agriculture. This declines by 41% when all employers who do not have eight or more workers in 26 or more weeks are excluded. Actual benefits paid out under the system are estimated to be $14 million under full coverage and $9 million under the least inclusive provision considered.

Similar information is shown in Table 2 for each of the 14 regional states. It is readily seen that there is considerable variation among the states both in terms of the number of workers involved and in the relation of actual benefits to taxable earnings. The latter rate varies from as small as 0.8% in Vermont to 6.7% in Connecticut. The number of persons who are potential beneficiaries shows considerable variation among states in relation to those who would be covered. Similarly, actual beneficiaries in relation to potential beneficiaries fluctuate. No attempt will be made in this report to give a complete explanation of the reasons for variations among states.[9] However, an obvious factor would be variations in the state unemployment insurance laws, affecting potential beneficiaries in particular. Different agricultural patterns among the states can also contribute greatly to this variation. For example, Vermont's agriculture is largely dairy farms requiring a rather stable labor force, whereas Connecticut's agricultural labor requirements are much more seasonal. These are only two examples among many. The important point to note is that the variations among states do not necessarily imply that workers' behavior is highly unpredictable. It is much more likely that differences as mentioned above account for a substantial part of the variation.

Reduced Migration

The preceding information is extremely useful for legislative purposes and should assist in permitting an informed decision con-

[8]If earnings and benefits are included regardless of the location of work, the rate is 3.2% to 3.5%, depending on the coverage provision. See Table 5.

[9]A discussion of the variation among states may be found in (*2*).

Table 2. — Summary for 14 regional states under full coverage. [a]

State	(1) Workers covered	(2) Potential beneficiaries	(3) Actual beneficiaries	(4) Additional actual benefits[b]	(5) Additional taxable earnings[c]	(6) (4) ÷ (5) x 100[d]
				Million dollars		
Connecticut	13,524	8,229	3,663	1.33	19.95	6.67
Delaware	3,834	3,149	1,491	.30	5.90	5.12
Florida	56,624	52,834	16,131	5.74	187.78	3.06
Maine	10,015	5,803	1,966	.24	13.83	1.72
Maryland	7,978	6,801	711	.28	17.99	1.58
Massachusetts	7,693	6,846	1,129	.64	20.76	3.06
New Hampshire	1,371	965	230	.06	2.49	2.62
New Jersey	16,071	12,893	4,933	1.64	28.20	5.81
New York	39,378	28,643	7,883	1.28	78.69	1.62
Ohio	25,394	15,505	5,582	1.50	37.34	4.03
Pennsylvania	20,762	16,329	3,437	.87	46.57	1.87
Rhode Island	565	484	143	.09	1.73	5.10
Vermont	3,955	2,814	160	.08	10.19	0.80
West Virginia	3,993	3,116	617	.10	6.87	1.47

[a] Workers of employers with one or more workers in one or more weeks.

[b] Included are additional actual benefits beyond actual benefits without agricultural coverage as estimated from the 14 state sample and allocated on the basis of work done in the respective states.

[c] Included are those earnings which would be taxable as a result of agricultural coverage for work done in each of the 14 states as estimated from the 14 state sample.

[d] These may not correspond directly due to rounding of columns (4) and (5).

cerning the question of the cost of extending unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers. A myriad of assumptions is required for any such estimates. Although the researcher generally tries to maintain the set of assumptions which permits the most useful analysis, he frequently relaxes certain assumptions to determine the sensitivity of the results to those particular assumptions.

One particular assumption upon which the previous results are based is that the individual worker will maintain the same work pattern as he did during the 52 week history which was utilized for the estimates. One might argue that the incentive to work is altered as a result of unemployment insurance protection for the worker. Such an effect is ignored in the previous estimates. A particular group of workers which might be most sensitive to this effect is migrant labor. It has been suggested that if the migrant worker were eligible for unemployment insurance benefits he might remain in his home state and collect benefits rather than go to another state for agricultural work. The effect of such a phenomenon on the cost of the extension of unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers is examined in this report.

Although migrant workers have been declining in relative importance in United States agriculture, they provide a large part of the seasonal labor for crops such as citrus. The survey upon which this study is based indicates that 24% of the hired agricultural labor force in the 14 state region is migrant labor, a considerably larger proportion than 7% for the United States (*25*; p. 2).[10] Although part of this variation may be a result of a different survey design, it is not unlikely that the 14 state region does in fact have a higher proportion of migrants than the United States as a whole. Thus, if such a phenomenon as indicated above were to occur, the states within this region would be affected more than some other states in the nation.

The following section of the report is a discussion of the adjustments which were made in the migrant labor work histories to simulate possible worker adjustments. The third section presents a comparison of migratory workers to all agricultural workers for items of importance to unemployment insurance. Section IV presents the results of the adjustments on the estimates of the cost of extending unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers. The final section is a summary of the report and the major findings.

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[10]The definitions are not the same in each case. The definition in this report is known earnings in more than one state, whereas the definition in (*25*) is work reported in more than one county. This actually tends to understate the difference, since some are included in (*25*) who would not be included in the present definition.

SECTION II
WORK ADJUSTMENT

The objective of this study was to determine the extent to which the cost of extending unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers is affected by alternative assumptions concerning the impact of such a program on the mobility of the migrant labor force. Migrant workers in this study were defined as those workers who crossed state lines for employment for at least one week during the 52 week period under consideration. This is more restrictive than the more usual definition encompassing those who crossed county lines for employment. However, it should be noted that in this survey the number who crossed county lines without crossing state lines was relatively small.[1]

Although the extension of unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers may affect the incentive to work for all workers, the focus of this study was on interstate migratory workers. It was assumed that they would be the most easily influenced by changes in work incentives. An economic rationale for this is that the marginal earnings of migrant workers from working in other states are less than for work in the home state. As a result, it could be argued that the availability of unemployment benefits would reduce the incentive to migrate to another state for work more than the labor supply of those workers who do not migrate. Whether or not this hypothesis is true has not been tested. It has merely been assumed to be true, and the effect on the cost of the extension of unemployment insurance protection has been determined.

The study is based on a slightly different set of workers than was the original study for the region (*2*). Whereas the latter considered all workers encountered in the survey, this report is limited to those workers who actually had known agricultural earnings during the analysis year. The basis was changed in order to more closely determine the impact of extending unemployment insurance coverage to agricultural employers. Included in the original population were some workers who had no agricultural employment during the analysis year.

Since only migrant work histories were adjusted, the workers were first divided into migrant and non-migrant categories. All computations relating to non-migrants were unaltered relative to the original study. For example, all information such as earnings, weeks of work, potential benefits, and actual benefits were the same for non-migrants in this study as in the original one.

The migrant worker was assumed to reduce his interstate employment and collect unemployment benefits during this period of time.

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[1]In Florida, for example, 25.8% of the workers were interstate workers. Intrastate workers were 7.9% of all workers, i. e., they crossed county lines for work in the same state. Only 44.1% of the intrastate workers (3.5% of all workers) had intrastate work but no interstate work.

Since he could only collect benefits if he met the benefit eligibility criteria, the work history adjustment was limited to those migratory workers who were potential beneficiaries.[2] Workers who were potential beneficiaries by covered non-farm employment alone were not included in the group to have their work histories adjusted. It was argued that since they were presently eligible for benefits and they were still migrating, any adjustment which they might make as a result of unemployment insurance benefits would have been made when they chose to work for a presently covered employer. Two adjustments, hereafter referred to as B and C, were then made in the work histories of the migratory workers who were selected for work adjustment in comparison to the actual employment histories, A:

A. No adjustment in the weeks of interstate work.
B. Fifty per cent reduction in the weeks of interstate work.
C. One-hundred per cent reduction in the weeks of interstate work.

Migrant Status

The data used permit two criteria for selecting which workers were interstate migrants. One was with reference to a question which specifically asked at the time of interview whether or not the worker did interstate work within the past 12 months. The difficulty with this criterion was that the 15 state standardized 52 week period differs from the 12 month period for which he would be responding. This would be particularly true for Florida where interviewing was done between mid-November 1970 and February 1971. The standardized 52 week period which is considered in this report refers to the period of July 5, 1969 to July 4, 1970. Consequently, the worker may have had work in more than one state in one period but not in the other. Hence, the criterion used for selection of interstate migrant workers was that they reported earnings from either agricultural or non-agricultural work from more than one state during the 52 week period under consideration.

Home State

Since interstate work was deleted alternatively by 50% and 100%, a consistent criterion for which work was interstate work was also necessary. Again, there were alternative criteria which could have been used. One choice could have been to declare all work outside the interview state as interstate work. But this was subject to the same problem of timing as mentioned above. Although the worker was obviously

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[2]Potential beneficiaries are defined as persons who could claim benefits if they had compensable unemployment irrespective of whether or not they had such weeks during their work history. There are of course, non-monetary eligibility criteria which must also be met. These are discussed later.

working in the interview state at the time of interview, he may have had little or no work in that state during the period analyzed. Another criterion which could have been used in some states was a question asked with reference to the worker's permanent address. However, this question was not asked by all of the 15 cooperating states. A third criterion, and the one which was used, could be applied to all states in the analysis: the state in which the worker had the most weeks of work with earnings was assumed to be the home state.[3] All work done in other states was considered to be interstate work.

Benefit Eligibility Restrictions

Once a home state was chosen, portions of the interstate work were deleted alternatively for the 50% and 100% reductions. Two constraints were imposed before any work was deleted. First, the worker must have met the monetary eligibility requirements by employment under covered employers. Although each state has its own laws for eligibility requirements (*26*), the eligibility requirements of the interview state were used for all workers regardless of their home state in order to maintain consistency with the original computations. The same was done for the benefit computations.[4] In addition, the worker could not quit a job and then claim unemployment benefits. Consequently, deletions of work were constrained to points at which the worker changed jobs in his work history.[5]

Given these two constraints, the procedure for deleting work was well defined. The home state was first examined to determine if the worker had met the monetary eligibility requirements. For example,

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[3]If the maximum number of weeks with earnings was the same for more than one state, the interview state was chosen as the home state if it was one of these states. If it was not, the state which occurred earliest in the worker's history of this group was chosen as the home state.

[4]If this were not done, comparisons with the original analysis would not be meaningful, since differences could be attributed to either the different benefit computation procedures for each state or the work adjustments. By basing all benefit computations on the interview state procedures, any differences can be directly attributed to the work adjustment.

[5]A job change is defined for purposes of this study as either a change in employer or a change in state of employment. The latter is included since the focus of the study is on migration. A change in state of employment without a change in employer is most likely to occur when the worker is working for a labor contractor. The employer-employee relationship is generally of a more casual nature in this case so that a worker could simply not move on to the next state without having formally quit his job. At any rate, the test for whether or not he had met the non-monetary benefit eligibility criteria would be somewhat more in his favor than if he formally left a "stationary" employer.

in Florida this required him to have had at least 20 weeks of work in his home state with average earnings of $20 or more. If he could not meet this requirement on the basis of home state work alone, interstate work was introduced until eligibility was met. Interstate work was introduced job-sequentially starting with the first interstate job following the first home state job.[6] The combination of home state work and this interstate job was then tested for eligibility. If it was still not met, the process continued until eligibility was met.[7]

Any interstate work introduced for eligibility purposes had two restrictions placed upon it. First, none of these jobs could be deleted later in the 50% and 100% interstate work reductions. If they were, the worker would no longer have been eligible for benefits, and hence, there would be no incentive for him to reduce his interstate work. Secondly, any interstate employment so introduced was introduced in its entirety. It is not permissible to introduce only a sufficient number of weeks of a job to meet the eligibility requirements and permit the remaining weeks of the job to be deleted later. This would imply that the worker was quitting his job to obtain unemployment benefits. This would clearly be in violation of the non-monetary eligibility requirements. It is important to note that in the particular case in which the worker did not meet eligibility by home state work alone and had only one interstate job, the latter restriction implies that no weeks of work would be deleted in either the 50% or 100% reductions. He was assumed to have the same employment and earnings before and after the introduction of unemployment insurance.

Work Reduction

Once eligibility was met, the appropriate interstate weeks of work were deleted to attain the 50% and 100% work reductions. The latter is more easily understood, and hence will be discussed first. If the worker met eligibility by home state work alone, all of his interstate weeks of work were deleted. As a result, his work history would consist of only those weeks of work in his home state. If interstate

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[6]The assumption of repetitive employment patterns becomes important again at this point. In essence, it is argued that the initial point is arbitrary for the individual. The first home state job has been chosen as the initial point. Introduction of interstate work is job-sequential following this job. Since this will generally not be on the first week of his work history, the interstate weeks which precede this job are assumed to be employment of the following year and are sequentially introduced after the interstate work through the 52nd week has been introduced.

[7]Eligibility was always eventually met since only potential beneficiaries were considered.

work were included to meet eligibility requirements, then all interstate jobs not used for eligibility purposes were deleted.[8] In this case, the revised work history would have both home state and some interstate work included. In such cases, the 100% reduction was obviously less than a complete reduction of interstate work.

The 50% reduction was an attempt to reduce interstate work by 50% of the weeks worked outside the home state. Just as the first interstate employment following the first home state jobs was introduced when required for eligibility purposes, the worker was assumed to migrate for interstate work during the weeks immediately following home state work. Since job changes generally will not occur at precisely the 50% point, the job change closest to the 50% point was chosen as the breaking point. All interstate employment following this point was deleted from the worker's history. However, two cases which should be noted in which the 50% reduction resulted in no reduction were 1) when the worker had only one interstate job, and 2) when all interstate employment was required for eligibility purposes.

Expansion to Population Estimates

At this point, all adjustments in the migrant worker employment histories have been made. The same computations were performed on the revised employment histories as were done on the original histories in the previous work. Each worker's information such as earnings was expanded by the inverse of his particular sampling rate in the survey. For example, if he represented 10 workers by being chosen in a 10% sample, his earnings were multiplied by 10 to obtain the corresponding population estimate. The expanded worker data were then accumulated over all workers to obtain the results for the entire worker population.

Population estimates of the following variables are given in the next section: the number of potential beneficiaries, the number of actual beneficiaries, the number of benefit exhaustees, total covered earnings, taxable covered earnings, potential benefits, actual benefits, and the ratio of actual benefits to taxable covered earnings. Each of these has been computed for migrants only and the population as a whole for a limited number of employer coverage provisions.

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[8]Recall that the interstate eligibility jobs could extend beyond the minimum eligibility period since the entire job was included; parts of jobs could not be deleted.

SECTION III
MIGRATORY WORKERS AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

It will be helpful to compare migratory workers with the typical farm worker on the basis of the relevant criteria for studying the effect of an unemployment insurance program. Migratory workers have been defined in this study as workers who had known earnings in more than one state. This is somewhat more restrictive than the more typical definition of those workers who cross county lines for work.[1] However, the first definition has more meaning for this study.

The beneficiary and coverage status of migratory workers is compared with all agricultural workers in Table 3.[2] As noted in the previous section, 24% of the workers were classified as migrant workers, giving a population estimate of 50,425 migrants. The first regularity to note is that migrants tend to work for larger employers than the average farm worker. The least inclusive employer coverage criterion, 8 or more workers in 26 or more weeks leaves 62% of the migrants covered whereas only 53% of all workers remain covered.

Migratory workers were more likely to have met the monetary eligibility criteria for unemployment insurance benefits than non-migrants. The percentage of migratory workers who were potential beneficiaries ranges from 89 to 66 over the coverage criteria considered, whereas the range is 78 to 50 for all workers taken together. As noted in Section I, the criterion for a potential beneficiary varies from state to state but it typically requires some combination of minimum earnings and weeks of work. For example, Florida law requires the worker to have worked for covered employers for 20 or more weeks at an average weekly wage of $20 or more. One may argue whether or not such a criterion represents a significant attachment to the labor force, but the results clearly indicate that there is a significant number of non-migrant workers who have less attachment to the labor force.

Migratory workers were also more likely to have had claims for unemployment insurance benefits. Depending on the particular coverage criterion, 28% to 42% of the migrants had compensable periods of unemployment and were also potential beneficiaries in contrast to 16% to 23% of all workers. A somewhat more appropriate comparison may be drawn by looking at the ratio of actual beneficiaries to potential beneficiaries for the respective groups, since a worker must be the latter before he can be classified as the former. From 43% to 47% of

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[1] See *Supra*, n. 1, p. 9.

[2] Appendix Table 1 summarizes the comparison for each state.

Table 3. — Migratory workers and all workers with respect to unemployment insurance benefit status: 14 state region.[a]

Employer coverage provision	Workers covered		Potential beneficiaries[b]		Actual beneficiaries[c]		Benefit exhaustees	
	Migrants only	All workers	Migrants only	All workers	Migrants only	All workers	Migrants only	All workers
1 in 1	50,425 (100.0)	211,157 (100.0)	44,900 (89.0)	164,411 (77.9)	21,091 (41.8)	48,076 (22.8)	2,551 (5.1)	10,521 (5.0)
1 in 20 or $1500 H.Q. payroll	49,980 (99.1)	204,091 (96.6)	44,751 (88.8)	161,292 (76.4)	21,007 (41.7)	47,420 (22.5)	2,517 (5.0)	10,146 (4.8)
4 in 20 or $5000 H.Q. payroll	44,067 (87.4)	156,324 (74.0)	42,004 (83.3)	134,550 (63.7)	19,233 (38.1)	42,647 (20.2)	2,445 (4.8)	8,930 (4.2)
4 in 20	38,969 (77.3)	143,357 (67.9)	38,485 (76.3)	127,690 (60.5)	16,843 (33.4)	39,346 (18.6)	1,633 (3.2)	7,924 (3.8)
8 in 25	31,470 (62.4)	111,117 (52.8)	33,410 (66.3)	106,326 (50.4)	14,247 (28.2)	34,183 (16.2)	1,319 (2.6)	7,032 (3.3)

[a] Immediately below each table entry is the percentage which this entry is of all migrants and workers, respectively.

[b] Included are 10,979 migrants and 23,826 under all workers who became potential beneficiaries by covered non-farm work alone. The respective percentages for migrants and all workers are 21.8 and 11.3.

[c] Included are 4,512 migrants and 8,351 under all workers who were actual beneficiaries without agricultural coverage. The respective percentages for migrants and all workers are 9.0 and 4.0.

migratory potential beneficiaries were actual beneficiaries and 29% to 32% of all potential beneficiaries were actual beneficiaries. Thus, the conclusion still holds that migrants who satisfied the monetary eligibility requirements were indeed more likely to have had compensable periods of unemployment.

Although one might expect relatively more migrants to exhaust their potential benefits since relatively more were actual beneficiaries, there is no discernible difference between the two groups. From 3% to 5% of the workers in each group were classified as benefit exhaustees.[3] A comparison with those who were potential beneficiaries is again appropriate. When so done the percentages range from 4% to 6% for migratory workers and 6% to 7% for all workers together.

The additional benefits and earnings resulting from agricultural coverage are summarized in Tables 4 and 5 for migrants in comparison to all workers.[4] Table 4 is based on work done within the 14 state region, whereas Table 5 includes all work regardless of location. As was the case with the workers who were covered under the less inclusive criteria, smaller proportions of migrant worker earnings are excluded in the less inclusive criteria than is the case for all farm workers. The least inclusive criterion excludes 35% of migratory covered earnings and 39% to 40% of covered earnings from all workers. Additional actual benefits for migrants in the least inclusive category (8 in 26) are 47% less for all locations than if all migrants were covered. In comparison, additional actual benefits for all workers in the least inclusive category are 36% less within the region and 37% less for all locations than if all agricultural workers were covered. These variations over the coverage criteria tend to indicate that not only do migratory workers work for larger employers in comparison to all workers (smaller decrease in earnings for the less inclusive criteria), but those who work for smaller employers tend to have less attachment to the labor force than the majority working for the larger employers as denoted by the larger decline in actual benefits.

The ratio of additional actual benefits to taxable agricultural earnings for work done within the 14 state region ranged from 3.9% to 4.9% over the coverage provisions for the migratory workers. If all earnings and work are included regardless of location, the rate varies between 4.3% and 5.3%. The rates for all workers are less, varying between 3.0% and 3.3%, and 3.2% and 3.5% over the coverage

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[3]Benefit exhaustees are defined as those persons for whom their actual benefits equal their potential benefits. The number is an under-estimate as a result of the benefit year being the same as the base year.

[4]Appendix Table 2 summarizes the information for each state.

provisions for work within the region and work in all locations, respectively. The rates are somewhat higher for migrant workers than for all workers taken together.[5] The purpose of looking at the rates for migrants separately is not that they should be considered as a separate risk group. Rather it is to determine the cost of an unemployment insurance program for migrants as a part of the agricultural labor force. It is clearly higher than for all farm workers, but it is not so high that the burden of the program would be shifted to employers of a non-migratory work force. Most states have maximum tax rates which are nearly as high as the rates shown for migrants (*26*).

In summary, we can conclude that the data indicate that the migrants tend to be employed by larger employers and have at least as strong an attachment to the labor force as do the average farm workers. The cost of protecting migrant workers under an unemployment insurance program is indicated to be somewhat higher than for the average farm worker as shown by the ratios of actual benefits to taxable agricultural earnings.

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[5]This is part of the basis for the statement in the Introduction that the possible over-sampling of migrants would lead to an over-estimate of increases in the cost rate resulting from the work reduction. In the case of over-sampling of migrants, their cost rate would be given too much weight in the above computations, resulting in a cost rate over all workers which is higher than in the case of an unbiased sample.

Table 4. — Additional benefits and covered earnings resulting from agricultural coverage: Work within 14 state region.

Item	Coverage provisions				
	1 in 1	1 in 20 or $1500 H. Q. payroll	4 in 20 or $5000 H. Q. payroll	4 in 20	8 in 26
	Million dollars				
Migrants only					
(1) Potential benefits[a]	32.54	32.38	29.13	25.76	20.38
(2) Actual benefits[a]	5.16	5.13	4.77	3.82	2.75
(3) Total covered agricultural earnings	111.14	110.71	99.44	89.31	72.43
(4) Taxable agricultural earnings	107.82	107.40	96.69	86.87	70.65
	Per cent				
(5) (2) ÷ (4) x 100	4.79	4.78	4.93	4.40	3.89

Table 4. — Continued.

Item	Coverage provisions				
	1 in 1	1 in 20 or $1500 H. Q. payroll	4 in 20 or $5000 H. Q. payroll	4 in 20	8 in 26
	Million dollars				
All workers					
(6) Potential benefits[a]	147.31	144.38	116.79	109.86	85.58
(7) Actual benefits[a]	14.15	13.85	12.45	11.19	9.08
(8) Total covered agricultural earnings	559.24	548.94	448.86	425.06	337.88
(9) Taxable agricultural earnings	478.29	468.85	377.13	355.52	280.76
	Per cent				
(10) (7) ÷ (9) x 100	2.96	2.95	3.30	3.15	3.23

[a] Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.

Table 5.— Additional benefits and covered earnings resulting from agricultural coverage: All locations.

Item	Coverage provisions				
	1 in 1	1 in 20 or $1500 H. Q. payroll	4 in 20 or $5000 H. Q. payroll	4 in 20	8 in 26
	Million dollars				
Migrants only					
(1) Potential benefits[a]	38.54	38.34	34.67	30.68	24.32
(2) Actual benefits[a]	6.64	6.58	6.12	4.90	3.58
(3) Total covered agricultural earnings	131.43	130.87	118.11	105.55	85.67
(4) Taxable agricultural earnings	127.89	127.32	115.12	102.90	83.73
	Per cent				
(5) (2) ÷ (4) x 100	5.19	5.17	5.32	4.76	4.28

Table 5. — Continued.

Item	Coverage provisions				
	1 in 1	1 in 20 or $1500 H. Q. payroll	4 in 20 or $5000 H. Q. payroll	4 in 20	8 in 26
	Million dollars				
All workers					
(6) Potential benefits[a]	154.82	151.84	123.62	89.62	64.68
(7) Actual benefits[a]	15.98	15.65	14.04	12.50	10.07
(8) Total covered agricultural earnings	585.53	575.06	473.01	446.23	355.20
(9) Taxable agricultural earnings	503.64	494.04	400.35	375.77	297.34
	Per cent				
(10) (7) ÷ (9) x 100	3.17	3.17	3.51	3.33	3.39

[a] Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.

SECTION IV
WORK REDUCTION AND ITS COST EFFECT

The Reductions

The effective work reduction for migratory workers was less than the hypothetical 50% and 100%, B and C, as a result of the restrictions imposed on the work deletion procedure outlined in Section II. Since the reduction variable is weeks of interstate work, the overall reduction is best measured by man-weeks of interstate employment before and after the reduction, as shown in Table 6.

Reduction C reduced interstate employment by 71%, leaving 29% of interstate employment unaffected. The primary reason for the divergence from 100% in this case is that no reductions were made for 10,979 or 22% of the migrant workers who were potential beneficiaries by non-farm work alone. Another less important reason in reduction C was that an interstate job might have been necessary for the worker to meet the monetary eligibility requirements. Also recall that this job had to remain in the work history in its entirety; only subsequent interstate employment could be deleted.

Case B did not perform as well in terms of meeting the desired reduction in interstate employment; 20% of interstate employment was deleted rather than 50%. Recalling the restrictions placed on work deletion for B in addition to those for C, employment could only be terminated at the change of employment. Thus, if the worker had only one interstate job and met eligibility by home state work alone, his interstate employment could not be reduced by 50%; there would be no reduction. Further investigation into the number of different states in which a worker worked and the number of times he changed employers indicates that migrant workers are not as unstable as they are often characterized. As shown in Table 7, 78% of the migrant workers worked in only two different states, the least possible number for the person to be classified a migrant. Only 22% changed employers four or more times during the year, and 24% changed employers or states four or more times during the year. This is rather revealing information

Table 6.—Interstate work summary.

Interstate employment	Man-weeks	Per cent
A. Actual	673,749	
B. After 50% reduction	540,096	80.2
Effective reduction	133,653	19.8
C. After 100% reduction	197,446	29.3
Effective reduction	476,303	70.7

Table 7. — Interstate workers by number of states and employer changes.

Number	States [a]	Employers [b]	Employer or state changes [c]
2	39,414	24,185	22,919
	(78.2)	(48.0)	(45.4)
3	8,391	14,171	15,217
	(16.6)	(28.1)	(30.2)
4	2,254	7,671	8,261
	(4.5)	(15.2)	(16.4)
5	308	2,034	2,432
	(0.6)	(4.0)	(4.8)
6 or more	65	1,353	1,602
	(0.1)	(2.7)	(3.2)

[a] These are workers with a given number of different states.

[b] These are workers with a given number of employer changes, not necessarily different employers. There were 1,012 workers (2.0%) with no employer changes.

[c] These are workers with a given number of employer or state changes, not necessarily different employers or different states in all cases.

about the stability of the migrant workers, but it also indicates that little would be gained by considering alternative reduction levels at less than 100% since the same problem would occur as with case B. The majority of the workers are not affected by anything less than the elimination of interstate work as long as the restriction to delete only entire jobs after the first interstate job is maintained for partial reduction.

As set forth earlier, the objective of the work reported upon herein was to examine the effects of changes in migratory work patterns on the cost of extending unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers. It has been shown in Section III that the ratio of additional actual benefits to taxable agricultural earnings for migratory workers would be somewhat higher than for all agricultural workers together. This was under the assumption of no change in the employment patterns of migrants and nonmigrants. The procedures were outlined in Section II for the partial reduction in interstate employment. It was shown above that as a result of restrictions placed upon the work reduction scheme in order to be consistent with unemployment insurance eligibility criteria, the 50% reduction (B) resulted in only a 20% effective reduction in interstate man-weeks (Table 6). Although this is less than desired, we shall see

that when taken in conjunction with the 100% reduction results, the results are still quite meaningful.

Two employer coverage provisions were selected for ease of exposition since there is no systematic difference in the relations across the coverage provisions for our purposes. The two provisions discussed in the remainder of the report are:

I. One or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.

II. Four or more workers in 20 or more weeks.

Weeks of work deleted are interstate weeks which may or may not be from states within the 14 state region. Hence, the results are summarized for earnings and benefits within the region only and for earnings and benefits regardless of the location.

Effect on Beneficiary Status[1]

Recall that only those workers who were potential beneficiaries were to have their interstate work reduced, and that no work could be deleted which would make them non-eligible for benefits. As a result of a programming error for the New Jersey program, a few workers were given deletions which made them ineligible for benefits after the 100% reduction.[2] Although this introduces a slight deviation from the established restrictions, the error is relatively small and should have no bearing on the results.

The number of migrants who were actual beneficiaries are shown in Table 8 to have increased substantially, as one would expect when weeks of employment were deleted. Under reduction B, the proportion of migrants who were actual beneficiaries increased from 42% to 56% and from 33% to 46% under provisions I and II, respectively. Reduction C increased the proportions to 75% and 63% for coverage provisions I and II, respectively, resulting from so many more workers being affected by reduction C. After reduction C, 82% and 85% of the migrants who were potential beneficiaries were actual beneficiaries for provisions I and II, respectively, corresponding with the high reduction achieved in man-weeks of interstate work. Reduction B resulted in 61% and 63% of the migrant potential beneficiaries becoming actual beneficiaries under provisions I and II, respectively. When non-migrants are included with the migrants to determine the relative effect over all workers, the

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[1]The results for individual states are shown in Appendix Table 3.

[2]There are 108 fewer potential beneficiaries in case C for Coverage I than in cases A and B; see Table 8. The cost of doing the New Jersey computations over was far in excess of any gains to be derived given the insignificance of the error in terms of the magnitudes being dealt with.

proportional changes are, of course, much less. The proportion of all workers who were actual beneficiaries increased to only 26% and 30% by reductions B and C, respectively, under provision I. The corresponding increases under provision II were from 19% to 22% and 26% for reductions B and C, respectively.

The number of migrants exhausting all of their benefits increased with reductions B and C, changing from 5% to 8% and 27% under coverage I. Similarly, under coverage II, they increased from 3% to 6% and 25% with reductions B and C, respectively. Since two-thirds to three-fourths of all migrants were actual beneficiaries after reduction C, it is surprising that not more than one-fourth would exhaust all of their benefits. This indicates a substantial degree of employment in the home state where no work was deleted. Again, when migrants are combined with non-migrants the relative changes are less, changing from 5% to 6% and 10% after reductions B and C under coverage I. The corresponding increases for coverage II were from 3.8% to 4.5% and 9% after reductions B and C, respectively.

Effect on Benefits and Earnings[3]

Potential benefits decreased with the reductions in employment as expected (Table 9). This resulted from the reduced employment rather than a reduction in the number of workers who were potential beneficiaries. The reductions for migrants were 3% for both provisions I and II by reduction B, and 12% and 13% by reduction C under provisions I and II, respectively. When taken over all workers this represents 1% and 3% for reductions B and C, respectively.

Taxable agricultural earnings of migratory workers decreased by somewhat greater proportions, 6% and 23% for reductions B and C, respectively, as shown in Table 10. When taken over all workers, the reductions were 1% and 5% under coverage I, and 2% and 6% under coverage II by reductions B and C, respectively. It should be noted that the relative, and absolute, changes in potential benefits are considerably less than those for taxable agricultural earnings. Whereas taxable earnings are reduced directly by a reduction in employment,[4] potential benefits are not necessarily reduced. Although the way in which potential benefits are affected is dependent on the state law for determining them, there are features common to

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[3]The results for individual states are shown in Appendix Table 4.

[4]This will be true unless the worker has more than $4200 of earnings from the particular employer for which he is now assumed not to work. In general, since most migrants have more than one employer, their earnings will not be greater than $4200 from one of the employers.

Table 8. — Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary status.[a]

Item	Employment reduction and coverage					
	I[b]			II[c]		
	A[d]	B[e]	C[f]	A[d]	B[e]	C[f]
Migrants only						
Potential beneficiaries[g]	44,751 (88.8)	44,751 (88.8)	44,643 (88.5)	38,485 (76.3)	38,485 (76.3)	38,398 (76.2)
Actual beneficiaries[h]	21,007 (41.7)	28,074 (55.7)	37,896 (75.2)	16,843 (33.4)	23,341 (46.4)	31,622 (62.7)
Benefit exhaustees	2,517 (5.0)	4,182 (7.6)	14,100 (27.0)	1,633 (3.2)	3,124 (6.2)	12,383 (24.6)
All workers						
Potential beneficiaries[i]	161,292 (76.4)	161,292 (76.4)	161,184 (76.3)	127,690 (60.5)	127,690 (60.5)	127,603 (60.4)
Actual beneficiaries[j]	47,420 (22.5)	54,484 (25.8)	64,307 (30.4)	39,346 (18.6)	45,843 (21.7)	54,127 (25.6)
Benefit exhaustees	10,146 (4.8)	11,813 (5.6)	21,732 (10.3)	7,924 (3.8)	9,415 (4.5)	18,676 (8.8)

[a] The numbers immediately below each entry are the percentages of total migrant workers and total workers for the respective sections of the table.
[b] Employer coverage provision: 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
[c] Employer coverage provision: 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
[d] No work adjustment.
[e] 50% interstate work reduction.
[f] 100% interstate work reduction.
[g] Included are 10,979 workers who became potential beneficiaries on the basis of non-farm work alone.
[h] Included are 4,512 workers who were actual beneficiaries without agricultural coverage.
[i] Included are 23,826 workers who became potential beneficiaries on the basis of non-farm work alone.
[j] Included are 8,351 workers who were actual beneficiaries without agricultural coverage.

Table 9.—Additional benefits with reduced migratory employment: Allocations to 14 state region.[a]

Benefits	Employment reduction and coverage					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
	Million dollars					
Migrants only						
Potential	32.38	31.40	28.65	25.76	24.96	22.43
	(100.0)	(97.0)	(88.5)	(100.0)	(96.9)	(87.1)
Actual	5.13	8.81	18.62	3.82	7.04	14.98
	(100.0)	(171.7)	(363.0)	(100.0)	(184.3)	(392.1)
All workers						
Potential	144.38	143.41	140.66	109.86	109.06	106.53
	(100.0)	(99.3)	(97.4)	(100.0)	(99.3)	(97.0)
Actual	13.85	17.53	27.34	11.19	14.41	22.35
	(100.0)	(126.6)	(197.4)	(100.0)	(128.8)	(199.7)

[a]Benefits were allocated to states in proportion to earnings from the respective states.

Table 10. — Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: 14 state region work only.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Migrants only						
(1) Actual benefits[a,b]	5.13 (100.0)	8.81 (171.7)	18.62 (363.0)	3.82 (100.0)	7.04 (184.3)	14.98 (392.1)
(2) Taxable agricultural earnings[b]	107.40 (100.0)	101.09 (94.1)	82.98 (77.3)	86.87 (100.0)	81.56 (93.9)	66.78 (76.9)
(3) (1)÷(2) x 100	4.78	8.72	22.44	4.40	8.63	22.43
All workers						
(4) Actual benefits[a,b]	13.85 (100.0)	17.53 (126.6)	27.34 (197.4)	11.19 (100.0)	14.41 (128.8)	22.35 (199.7)
(5) Taxable agricultural earnings[b]	468.85 (100.0)	462.54 (98.6)	444.44 (94.8)	355.52 (100.0)	350.20 (98.5)	335.42 (94.3)
(6) (4)÷(5) x 100	2.95	3.79	6.15	3.15	4.11	6.66

[a] Additional benefits resulting from agricultural coverage.
[b] Million dollars.

most(*26*). First, there is generally a maximum level of potential benefits which can be accumulated. When the maximum is attained, additional earnings do not affect the level of potential benefits. Consequently, if a worker has exceeded this level, his potential benefits would remain constant over part or all of the employment reduction. Secondly, when potential benefits are below the maximum level, a reduction in earnings may result in a less than proportional decline in benefits.

One would expect actual benefits to increase with the introduction of compensable unemployment by reductions B and C. The respective increases over all workers were 27% and 97% under provision I, and 29% and 100% under provision II. Although these are markedly larger relative increases than the decreases of potential benefits and taxable earnings, the base is much smaller than for the latter two. The magnitudes of the changes under provision I are increases of $3.68 and $13.49 million in actual benefits as compared to $.97 and $3.72 million decreases in potential benefits with reductions B and C, respectively.[5] The difference in absolute magnitudes between actual and potential benefit changes can be attributed to some workers having the maximum level of potential benefits such that there can be some decrease in employment without any effect on their potential benefits. In contrast, since relatively few workers were benefit exhaustees and most were potential beneficiaries in case A, any reduction in employment resulted in an increase in actual benefits.

Effect on the Cost of the Program

One of the more important criteria in evaluating the cost of extending unemployment insurance protection to a group of workers is the relation of additional taxable earnings to additional benefits which would be paid out for claims. The self-supporting system collects its funds by a tax on the employer's payroll.[6] The cost information is given in Table 10 where actual benefits represent additional claims which would be made upon the system as a result of agricultural coverage under the alternative assumptions. The taxable earnings represent the additions to the tax base upon which the fund would be supported. As indicated above, taxable earnings declined by 1% and 5% for reductions B and C, respectively, under provision I. The increase in actual benefits of 27% and 97% has also been discussed. With an increase in actual benefits and a decrease in

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[5]Coverage II has similar differences: $3.22 and $11.16 million increases for actual benefits with $.80 and $3.33 million decreases for potential benefits.

[6]The determination of the tax rate was discussed in the Introduction.

Table 11. — Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: All locations.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Migrants only						
(1) Actual benefits [a,b]	6.58 (100.0)	10.88 (165.3)	21.11 (320.8)	4.90 (100.0)	8.66 (176.7)	16.93 (345.5)
(2) Taxable agricultural earnings [b]	127.32 (100.0)	118.52 (93.1)	94.10 (73.9)	102.90 (100.0)	95.49 (92.8)	75.46 (73.3)
(3) (1)÷(2)x 100	5.17	9.18	22.43	4.76	9.07	22.44
All workers						
(4) Actual benefits [a,b]	15.65 (100.0)	19.95 (127.5)	30.18 (192.8)	12.50 (100.0)	16.26 (130.1)	24.54 (196.3)
(5) Taxable agricultural earnings [b]	494.04 (100.0)	485.24 (98.2)	460.82 (93.3)	375.77 (100.0)	368.36 (98.0)	348.34 (92.7)
(6) (4)÷(5)x 100	3.17	4.11	6.55	3.33	4.41	7.04

[a] Additional benefits resulting from agricultural coverage.
[b] Million dollars.

taxable earnings, the ratio of the former to the latter necessarily increases. The rate increased from 2.95 to 3.79 for all workers with reduction B and from 2.95 to 6.15 with reduction C. Similar relations hold between benefits and earnings under provision II with the rate increasing from 3.15 to 4.11 by reduction B and from 3.15 to 6.66 by reduction C.[7] Reduction B results in roughly a one percentage point increase in the cost rate. This cost rate roughly doubles with a nearly complete elimination of interstate work.[8]

The corresponding information is given in Table 11 for work done in all locations. The earnings and benefits were, of course, larger when all employment was included. However, the relative changes are similar. The cost rates, although slightly higher than when only regional employment was included, change in approximately the same way, also.

Reductions in interstate employment and the ensuing effects on the rate have been shown. Given the employment records of migratory workers as compared to all workers, one would expect an increase in the cost rates, but the magnitude of the increase could not be predicted without a test such as has been reported upon here. There were, in essence, two unknowns creating the need for a project such as this: (1) the employment characteristics of migratory workers in contrast to non-migratory workers, and (2) given knowledge of the first, what would be the magnitude of the effect of a reduction in mobility on the cost of unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers? The inter-relation of these two factors and the implications of the results are explored in the following and concluding section.

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[7]The above estimates are all based on additional benefits and taxable earnings for employment in the 14 state region.

[8]The increase in the cost rates in conjunction with migrant rates being higher than the rates for all workers is a sufficient condition for the statement in the Introduction that the possible over-sampling of migrants in the region results in an upward bias in the cost rate change.

SECTION V
CONCLUSIONS

Information has been presented on the employment characteristics of migratory workers in contrast to non-migratory workers. As indicated by the relatively higher number of migrants who met the monetary eligibility requirements for unemployment insurance benefits, migrants had a slightly stronger attachment to the labor force than the average farm worker. It was also shown that the relative number of actual beneficiaries was somewhat higher for migrants than was the case for the average farm worker. One possible explanation for this is that more migratory workers may have been heads of household than was the case for the average farm worker. For example, it is well-known that many farm workers are students; their time spent in school is not compensable for unemployment insurance benefits. The latter explanation is not intended to explain the entire difference in the two sets of workers, but would certainly contribute to the difference which is noted in actual beneficiaries.

The relatively high number of migrants who met the eligibility requirements indicates a somewhat less casual labor force than is often thought to be the case. Included in the non-migratory category must be a larger proportion of workers who have extremely short durations of employment.

Given this information, the direction of change in the cost rate with reduced employment is more predictable. The question then is more in terms of the magnitude of change. By reducing interstate employment, additional taxable earnings decreased and additional actual benefits increased. In such a case the ratio of the latter to the former unambiguously increases. This rate increased from 3.15% to 4.11% and 6.66% for all employment within the 14 state region with work reductions B and C,[1] respectively, and the coverage provision of 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks. Similar results were obtained for the other coverage provisions examined.

The Likelihood of the Reductions

The remaining question once the cost rate change has been estimated, is how likely is such a change in migratory behavior? Although the cost rate for the region lies within the interval of 6% to 7% after the maximum reduction in interstate employment, the individual state cost rates should be examined. As shown in Appendix Table 4, there is considerable variation among the states

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[1]B refers to the 50% reduction in weeks of interstate employment, and C refers to the 100% reduction in weeks of interstate employment.

in how the rates are affected. However, in most cases even after reduction C, the rates are not far above the maximum tax rates for employers under the respective unemployment insurance laws.[2] It should be noted that the cost rate for New York which has a large number of migrant workers is still below the maximum tax rate after reduction C. However, in light of the adjustments in employment which have been imposed and the ensuing effects on the cost rate, one has to question how much of a reduction in interstate employment there might be as a result of extending unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers. No attempt to determine the extent of this reduction has been made in this project.

Some pertinent information relating to the question raised above is included in Table 12. One would expect the individual's choice of whether to continue employment or to become unemployed and collect unemployment insurance benefits, if such a program were in effect,[3] to be based in part on the benefits obtained in relation to the earnings foregone. There is also the added incentive of free time if he is able to collect benefits in lieu of working.

The first column of Table 12 indicates the benefits which could have been claimed under two coverage criteria and the alternative work reductions. Recall that the item corresponding with A refers to benefits which could have been claimed during periods of time in the worker's employment records which were of a compensable nature. In addition, the items for B and C include benefits which could have been claimed during periods when the worker had his interstate work deleted. The second column is total earnings of the workers under the alternative reduction schemes. Benefits include those attributed to both covered agricultural and non-agricultural work without regard to the location of the work. The total earnings column includes all earnings of *covered* workers since their non-covered earnings would be just as important as covered earnings in deciding whether or not to migrate.[4] The third column is the sum of the first two indicating a total income concept from combined benefits and earnings.

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[2] See the respective state reports for a discussion of the relation of cost rates to tax rates for individual states (*1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22*).

[3] This, of course, assumes that the individual has met the non-monetary eligibility requirements such as there being no suitable work available for him in periods of unemployment.

[4] Total earnings includes in addition to agricultural and covered non-agricultural earnings of covered workers, non-covered non-agricultural earnings, earnings from self-employment, and earnings of unknown type of covered workers.

Table 12. — Effect of work reduction on income of migrants. [a]

Employment coverage/reduction	(1) Actual benefits	(2) Total earnings	(3) Total income [b]	(4) Income loss as per cent of total income
	——— Million dollars ———			
I.				
A	8.12	169.71	177.83	
B	12.42	159.66	172.28	
Gain (Loss)	4.30	(9.85)	(5.55)	(3.1)
C	22.65	132.83	155.48	
Gain (Loss)	14.53	(36.88)	(22.35)	(12.6)
II.				
A	6.45	150.83	157.28	
B	10.20	141.43	151.63	
Gain (Loss)	3.75	(9.40)	(5.65)	(3.6)
C	18.48	118.05	136.53	
Gain (Loss)	12.03	(32.78)	(20.75)	(13.2)

[a] Included are all agricultural and non-agricultural earnings and benefits of migratory workers for all employment locations.

[b] Actual benefits plus total earnings; column (1) plus column (2).

The net gain or loss to the workers can then be determined for the alternative reductions. For example, under coverage I, reduction B results in a $9.85 million loss in total earnings, but only a $5.55 million loss in total income. This represents a net reduction of 3.1% in comparison to total income with no change in interstate migration. Reduction C results in a net loss of 12.6% in comparison to total income with no change in interstate migration. The net loss percentages obtained for coverage II were 3.6 and 13.2 for B and C, respectively. This table gives some indication of the relative magnitude of earnings foregone in the aggregate by the imposed reductions in migration.

A somewhat better indication may be obtained by placing this relative change on a per person basis as in Table 13. In this way, the comparison may be made for those persons who actually had changes in interstate work introduced rather than imposing the change over all migratory workers. The important consideration is how reasonable a particular change is for the worker whose employment history was altered. The individual could be expected to make a choice, assuming he has such a choice, based on the loss in income in comparison to the additional weeks he now does not work.

Under coverage provision I, there were 13,559 and 32,513 migratory workers under reductions B and C, respectively, who were

Table 13. — Work reduction and income loss per person.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage			
	I		II	
	B	C	B	C
Persons with work reduction	13,559	32,513	10,588	26,562
Man-weeks prior to reduction	633,258	1,516,417	503,776	1,248,882
Weeks per person	46.7	46.6	47.6	47.0
Man-weeks reduction	129,901	474,340	109,267	395,045
Reduction per person (weeks)	9.6	14.6	10.3	14.9
Reduction per person (percent)	20.6	31.3	21.6	31.7
Loss in total income ($ million) [a]	5.55	22.35	5.65	20.75
Loss in total income per person ($)	409	687	534	781
Loss in total income as per cent of total income per person [b]	11.6	19.4	15.1	22.1

[a] See Table 12, column (3).

[b] Average earnings, average actual benefits, and average income for migrants were $3,372, $162, and $3,534, respectively.

given work reductions. The average reduction for these workers was 9.6 and 14.6 weeks in B and C, respectively. The relative reductions were 20.6% and 31.3% based on averages of 46.7 and 46.6 weeks of employment per person adjusted. Similar reductions were obtained for coverage II as shown in Table 13. When considered in this way, the 50% reduction is not as far away from the 100% reduction as when man-weeks over all persons are accumulated. It is seen that the major reason for reduction B not meeting the 50% reduction is that most of the migratory workers were not adjusted in this case. Again, this occurred as a result of so many workers having only two jobs.

When the loss is placed on a per person adjusted basis for coverage I, the loss per person is $409 and $687 for B and C, respectively. The corresponding losses for coverage II are $534 and $781. If these are compared to the average total income of migrant workers, the losses represent 11.6% and 19.4% of total income of the workers, respectively, under provision I.[5] Provision II results in somewhat larger relative losses, representing losses of 15.1% and 22.1% for reductions B and C. Whether or not this is a large or small relative decline in income is a question which the reader must answer for himself at the present, and a question on which further research should be done. At the present, one can only subjectively evaluate whether or not workers would be willing to give up the above proportion of income for the indicated weeks of reduction in work.

Implications for the Supply of and Demand for Labor

Reductions in the quantity of labor have been imposed to determine the possible effects on the cost of extending unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers. The reductions, if they were to occur, would be expected to increase the wage rates for agricultural workers in those areas where the reduction in labor supply was significant. Since some states use migratory labor over rather short periods of time and others characteristically have longer periods of employment, the reductions imposed in this report will have effects of different magnitudes in the respective areas.

Migrants have been classified by home state and interview state in Table 14. Florida is the only state of the 14 states which has fewer migrants by interviewing than by home state classification. Although 27% of the 14 state population of migratory workers was from the Florida sample, nearly twice as many, 47%, from the 14

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[5]This assumes that workers who were given work adjustments had the same average income as all migratory workers.

Table 14. — Migrants by interview state and home state.

Area	Migrants by home state		Migrants by interview state	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Connecticut	1,456	2.9	3,220	6.4
Delaware	563	1.1	2,235	4.4
Florida	23,729	47.0	13,781	27.3
Maine	301	0.6	764	1.5
Maryland	837	1.6	1,872	3.7
Massachusetts	577	1.1	818	1.6
New Hampshire	74	0.1	160	0.3
New Jersey	2,672	5.3	7,898	15.7
New York	2,740	5.4	9,970	19.8
Ohio	1,784	3.5	5,994	11.9
Pennsylvania	1,718	3.4	2,872	5.7
Rhode Island	8	a	44	0.1
Vermont	204	0.4	240	0.5
West Virginia	264	0.5	557	1.1
14 State region	36,927	73.2	50,425	100.0
Other areas	13,498	26.8	b	b

[a] Less than .05%.
[b] Not applicable.

state region had Florida as their home state.[6] It should be noted that 73% of the migrants were assigned home states within the 14 state region. Of the 13,498 who were assigned home states outside the region, nearly half were assigned to Puerto Rico, 5,937. This confirms much of what is already known about labor migration, namely that Florida is a large supplier in the Eastern Seaboard Migratory Stream and that Puerto Rico also supplies a relatively large number of workers to Northeastern states. It should also be noted that the stream is relatively self-contained with 73% of the workers having home states within the region.

The reduction in employment within a particular area has been measured in man-weeks of agricultural labor.[7] The imposed reductions represent a shift to the left of the supply function of agricultural labor. Given a downward sloping demand curve for agricultural

[6] This, more than any other point in the report, demonstrates the degree to which workers migrated between Florida and other states. At the same time, it must be interpreted with caution due to the possible problems resulting from different interview times in Florida than in other states. See p. 3.

[7] This excludes non-agricultural employment, self-employment, and employment of unknown type.

labor, this implies an increase in the wage rate. One approach for approximating the pressure or degree of disequilibrium in the labor market which would result from the above reductions is to consider the implied increases in wage rates. One of the limitations to this is that the eliminated employment is primarily seasonal employment. Not only do we lack adequate demand estimates for seasonal labor, but there are also different bases to be used for determining the relative magnitudes of the reductions. The relative reductions as compared to the base of total man-weeks of agricultural labor for the respective areas are shown in Table 15 for coverage provision II

Reduction B resulted in a decline of 1.1% of agricultural man-weeks within the 14 state region. The corresponding estimate for

Table 15.—Employment reductions and implied wage rate changes.

Area[a]	Agricultural man-weeks reduction		Implied wage rate change given demand elasticity of[b]		
			-.25	-1.0	-1.5
	Number	Per cent	Per cent		
Reduction B[c]					
14 state region	75,944	1.08	4.32	1.08	0.72
Connecticut	1,843	0.64	2.56	0.64	0.43
Delaware	1,008	1.15	4.60	1.15	0.77
Florida	4,791	0.18	0.72	0.18	0.12
Maryland	7,187	2.65	10.60	2.65	1.77
New Jersey	18,056	4.69	18.76	4.69	3.13
New York	20,294	1.72	6.88	1.72	1.15
Ohio	14,607	2.42	9.68	2.42	1.61
Pennsylvania	7,194	0.98	3.92	0.98	0.65
Reduction C[c]					
14 state region	266,886	3.80	15.20	3.80	2.53
Connecticut	7,555	2.62	10.48	2.62	1.75
Delaware	5,416	6.19	24.88	6.19	4.13
Florida	41,118	1.56	6.24	1.56	1.04
Maryland	16,473	6.07	24.28	6.07	4.05
Massachusetts	4,168	1.50	6.00	1.50	1.00
New Jersey	64,028	16.64	66.56	16.64	11.09
New York	68,609	5.82	23.28	5.82	3.88
Ohio	29,826	4.94	19.76	4.94	3.29
Pennsylvania	27,398	3.73	14.92	3.73	2.49
West Virginia	1,494	1.07	4.28	1.07	0.71

[a] States with reductions of fewer than 500 man-weeks are not listed separately.
[b] This assumes the supply of man-weeks is perfectly inelastic.
[c] Employer coverage provision of 4 of more workers in 20 or more weeks

reduction C was 3.8%. There is considerable disparity among the states for both reductions. Reduction B resulted in decreases of 0.2% in Florida to 4.7% in New Jersey. Reduction C resulted in decreases of 1.1% in West Virginia to 16.6% in New Jersey. It is interesting to note that Florida had the smallest decrease in Case B and was very low (1.6%) in case C. This results from so many of the migrants having Florida as their home state; deleted employment for those workers resulted in deletions in states other than Florida. New Jersey stands out in both reductions B and C as having the largest reduction. The characteristic feature of New Jersey would appear to be that 49% of their worker population was classified as migratory as compared to 24% for the 14 state region. However, only one-third as many workers from the region were given New Jersey as a home state. As a result, the remaining two-thirds of the workers who were given work reductions would have had New Jersey employment deleted even though they were interviewed in New Jersey. Although this results from the procedures used in the study, the result provides information with respect to the question asked. New Jersey's agriculture requires a relatively large number of seasonal workers for a short period of time. If workers were to reduce their migration, New Jersey would be one of the more critical states.

Approximations to possible wage increases or disequilibrium imposed on the agricultural labor market by reductions such as those set forth herein may be obtained by comparison of the employment reductions with the elasticity of demand for labor. There is no single elasticity of demand for labor, but a range of feasible estimates of the elasticity does exist. Various studies of the demand for hired agricultural labor indicate that the range is -1.5 to -.25 (*3, 12, 18, 21, .23, 24, 27*). These estimates have generally been based on national data and annual observations. Although there are regional estimates, particularly Schuh and Leeds (*21*), Tyrchniewicz and Schuh (*24*), and Glover (*12*), these are not of too much use for our purposes other than verifying that the regions are not too dissimilar such that the above range of estimates is still appropriate.[8] The way in which seasonality affects the demand for labor has yet to be well established, however. The data simply have not revealed great differences in the elasticity of demand among seasons on the basis of models used thus far (*12*).

Many of the earlier studies of the demand for agricultural labor

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[8]The New England and Mid-Atlantic regions could be used since the data cover those regions. However, the range of estimates utilized includes estimates obtained for these regions.

tend to show elasticities at the lower absolute end of the range, whereas the more recent ones tend to be larger in absolute value, generally being elastic. The implied changes in the wage rate (assuming perfectly inelastic supply) are shown in Table 15 for reductions B and C for three demand elasticities: -.25, -1.0, and -1.5. In the author's judgment, the "true" elasticity is between -1.0 and -1.5. For simplicity, we can assume for discussion purposes that the elasticity is -1.0, resulting in wage rate changes of equal magnitude but opposite sign of the employment reductions. The wage rate changes, assuming that the elasticity of demand is indeed between -1.0 and -1.5, would be somewhat smaller than those discussed as evaluated with an elasticity of -1.0. The resulting increase in the wage rate for the region after reduction B is then 1.1%. The range for the states is, of course, the same as for the reductions in man-weeks, 0.2% to 4.7%. Similarly, reduction C would result in a 3.8% wage rate increase for the region with a range across the states of 1.5% to 16.6%.

The implied wage rate increases must be interpreted with extreme caution. First, they are based on the assumed reductions in employment presented in this report. The likelihood of the reductions is in itself questionable. Secondly, the estimates assume that the supply shifts immediately and fully with the introduction of unemployment insurance. This would not be the case in actuality since there are considerable lags in economic behavior. As a result, workers, if they were to adjust their labor supply, would adjust their supply over a long period of time, not all in the first year. Lags in the supply function of agricultural labor have been well documented by Tyrchniewicz and Schuh (*24*). Third, the supply function is assumed to be perfectly inelastic. Since the supply is somewhat elastic (*24*; p. 550), the effect on implied wage rate changes is to overestimate the increase. Finally, there are also lags in the behavior of the employer. Given a longer period of time, the employer has the option of substituting other factors of production for labor and thus further reducing the pressure on the labor market.

The implied wage rate changes are included primarily for illustrative purposes to further evaluate the reductions assumed in this report. They are expected, however, to place extreme upper bounds on any disequilibrium which might occur in the agricultural labor market.

Limitations

The major limitation of the analysis has been indicated in the first part of this section. Given the change in cost rate, how reasonable is the adjustment which has been made? The major conclusion

which can be drawn from such an approach is simply an upper bound for the cost rate; there is no basis for assuming that such an imposed decrease in migration will occur as has been imposed in the analysis. Rather, it is shown that *if* such a phenomenon were to occur in these magnitudes the effect on the cost rate for the extension of unemployment insurance protection to agricultural workers would be as shown.

The major limitation in achieving the work reductions for the 50% and 100% interstate work reductions was the limited number of jobs which the workers had. Since one cannot leave a job voluntarily and then collect benefits, a similar restriction was imposed in the reduction procedure--jobs could only be deleted at changes in employment. As a result, intermediate work reductions of whatever proportion, in this case 50%, are not very closely approximated. Such a procedure requires workers with continuous job changes to be effective. Migratory workers do not have this characteristic; their job changes are quite discrete.

From the legalistic viewpoint, a major limitation is the assumption that the worker is free to choose between employment or remaining unemployed and collecting unemployment insurance benefits. The individual is, in fact, not quite this free. For example, he must accept any employment which is in his line of work if it is within reasonable distance of his home location. Since there is no experience with such situations for migratory workers, it is unclear whether a worker with a history of traveling across several states for employment would be required to do so or he would be classified as unemployed and be eligible for benefits. This also assumes that there is no work available for him in his home location. The effect of this limitation on the analysis is to overstate the extent of work reduction there would be as a result of an unemployment insurance program protecting migratory agricultural workers.

The definition utilized to define which workers were interstate migratory workers is an operational definition for this study, not without its limitations. The definition has the advantage of including only those workers who demonstrated that they crossed state lines during the period under consideration. Secondly, the criterion could be used in all states considered. One disadvantage of the definition is that it gives a different number of migratory workers relative to all workers who responded that they had crossed state lines for work in the previous 12 months.

Another limitation is that the analysis is highly static. Reductions in employment have been imposed with no compensating effect from the demand for labor. Reductions in interstate migration could be expected to have significant effects on employers; i.e. particular groups of employers utilizing migratory labor services would have insuffi-

cient labor to harvest their crops. Implications on the wage rate for agricultural labor have been examined in the previous sub-section. In the short run, the wage would be driven up by the reduced number of workers available for harvest. A longer run effect might be to seek more mechanization so that they would have less reliance upon labor.

A consideration which is often neglected in considering the effects of the extension of unemployment insurance protection to a group of workers is the benefit to the worker in addition to the actual benefits for periods of unemployment. The employer, in essence, is paying for an insurance policy for his workers and accepting some of the risk for possible lay-offs of his workers. Consequently, the worker bears less of this risk and may, as a result, be willing to accept a lower wage rate than he otherwise would have. Although the employer would have to pay the payroll tax, he might also have a compensating reduction in wages or wage increases. Also, in comparison to employers who are not covered by unemployment insurance, the employer who is covered would be expected to be at a comparative advantage in attracting workers.

Concluding Remarks

It has been found on the basis of a survey of agricultural workers in 14 states, that the effect of presently migrating workers discontinuing such migration would be to approximately double the cost rate for unemployment insurance protection for agricultural workers. However, even after doubling, the rate is in the neighborhood of 6%. The limitations of the analysis have been indicated above and should be carefully noted. Most importantly, one should note that no evidence has been presented to indicate that migratory workers would decrease their migration by any degree whatever. The procedure has only been to determine the effect on the cost of an unemployment insurance program for farm workers if such a phenomenon were to occur.

APPENDIX

Appendix Table 1.—Coverage and beneficiary status of migrants and all workers:[a] 14 regional states.

State	Workers covered		Potential beneficiaries		Actual beneficiaries		Benefit exhaustees	
	Migrants only	All workers	Migrants only	All workers	Migrants only	All workers	Migrants only	All workers
Connecticut	3,220	13,524	2,423	8,229	1,626	3,663	330	983
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(75.2)	(60.8)	(50.5)	(27.1)	(10.3)	(7.3)
Delaware	2,235	3,834	1,844	3,149	1,162	1,491	20	104
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(82.5)	(82.1)	(52.0)	(38.9)	(0.9)	(2.7)
Florida	13,781	56,624	13,232	52,834	4,981	16,131	869	4,682
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(96.0)	(93.3)	(36.2)	(28.5)	(6.3)	(8.3)
Maine	764	10,015	749	5,803	481	1,966	18	615
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(98.0)	(57.9)	(63.0)	(19.6)	(2.4)	(6.1)
Maryland	1,872	7,978	1,832	6,801	342	711	34	135
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(97.8)	(85.2)	(18.3)	(8.9)	(1.8)	(1.7)
Massachusetts	818	7,693	818	6,846	153	1,129	75	707
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(89.0)	(18.8)	(14.7)	(9.3)	(9.2)
New Hampshire	160	1,371	144	965	30	230	2	47
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(90.2)	(70.4)	(19.2)	(16.8)	(1.5)	(3.5)
New Jersey	7,898	16,071	7,272	12,893	3,204	4,933	367	1,007
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(92.1)	(80.2)	(40.6)	(30.7)	(4.7)	(6.3)
New York	9,970	39,378	8,928	28,643	4,427	7,883	163	343
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(89.6)	(72.7)	(44.4)	(20.0)	(1.6)	(0.9)

Appendix Table 1.—Continued.

State	Workers covered		Potential beneficiaries		Actual beneficiaries		Benefit exhaustees	
	Migrants only	All workers	Migrants only	All workers	Migrants only	All workers	Migrants only	All workers
Ohio	5,994	25,394	4,529	15,505	3,217	5,582	589	1,570
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(75.6)	(61.1)	(53.7)	(22.0)	(9.8)	(6.2)
Pennsylvania	2,872	20,762	2,454	16,329	1,164	3,437	63	223
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(85.5)	(78.7)	(40.5)	(16.6)	(2.2)	(1.1)
Rhode Island	44	565	42	484	21	143	8	20
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(95.6)	(85.6)	(49.1)	(25.4)	(18.2)	(3.6)
Vermont	240	3,955	170	2,814	9	160	0	3
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(70.8)	(71.1)	(3.8)	(4.1)	(0.0)	(0.1)
West Virginia	557	3,993	463	3,116	274	617	18	82
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(83.2)	(78.0)	(49.2)	(15.5)	(3.3)	(2.1)

[a] Full coverage.

Appendix Table 2.—Additional benefits and covered earnings resulting from agricultural coverage: [a] 14 regional states.

State	(1) Potential benefits	(2) Actual benefits	(3) Total covered agricultural earnings	(4) Taxable agricultural earnings	(5) (2) ÷ (4) x 100
	Million dollars				
Connecticut					
Migrants only	1.57	.59	3.71	3.70	15.88
All workers	10.73	1.33	25.79	19.95	6.67
Delaware					
Migrants only	.80	.22	2.30	2.26	9.78
All workers	1.88	.30	6.34	5.90	5.12
Florida					
Migrants only	16.28	1.88	60.38	58.27	3.23
All workers	52.03	5.74	214.21	187.78	3.06
Maine					
Migrants only	.35	.03	1.30	1.11	2.60
All workers	4.21	.24	15.69	13.83	1.72
Maryland					
Migrants only	1.03	.13	3.04	3.03	4.38
All workers	5.86	.28	19.76	17.99	1.58
Massachusetts					
Migrants only	.50	.10	1.53	1.50	6.44
All workers	7.80	.64	26.25	20.76	3.06
New Hampshire					
Migrants only	.04	.005	.16	.16	3.19
All workers	.88	.06	2.93	2.49	2.62

Appendix Table 2.—Continued.

State	(1) Potential benefits	(2) Actual benefits	(3) Total covered agricultural earnings	(4) Taxable agricultural earnings	(5) (2) ÷ (4) x 100
	Million dollars				
New Jersey					
Migrants only	3.84	.90	10.97	10.88	8.31
All workers	10.04	1.64	31.14	28.20	5.81
New York					
Migrants only	4.22	.55	15.46	14.86	3.68
All workers	23.58	1.28	94.51	78.69	1.62
Ohio					
Migrants only	1.41	.43	4.86	4.84	8.80
All workers	10.87	1.50	45.41	37.34	4.03
Pennsylvania					
Migrants only	2.31	.31	6.67	6.48	4.78
All workers	16.82	.87	55.93	46.57	1.87
Rhode Island					
Migrants only	.02	.005	.05	.05	10.55
All workers	.73	.09	2.39	1.73	5.10
Vermont					
Migrants only	.05	.005	.18	.18	2.62
All workers	2.77	.08	11.62	10.19	.80
West Virginia					
Migrants only	.10	.01	.52	.49	2.51
All workers	1.82	.10	7.25	6.87	1.47

[a] Full coverage.

Appendix Table 3.—Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary status: Connecticut.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Migrants only						
Potential beneficiaries	2,418 (75.1)	2,418 (75.1)	2,418 (75.1)	2,173 (67.5)	2,173 (67.5)	2,173 (67.5)
Actual beneficiaries	1,626 (50.5)	1,682 (52.2)	1,887 (58.6)	1,451 (45.1)	1,474 (45.8)	1,641 (51.0)
Benefit exhaustees	330 (10.3)	392 (12.2)	742 (23.1)	200 (6.2)	263 (8.2)	575 (17.9)
All workers						
Potential beneficiaries	8,055 (59.6)	8,055 (59.6)	8,055 (59.6)	7,076 (52.3)	7,076 (52.3)	7,076 (52.3)
Actual beneficiaries	3,623 (26.8)	3,678 (27.2)	3,883 (28.7)	3,323 (24.6)	3,346 (24.7)	3,513 (26.0)
Benefit exhaustees	983 (7.3)	1,046 (7.7)	1,396 (10.3)	817 (6.0)	880 (6.5)	1,192 (8.8)

Delaware.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Migrants only						
Potential beneficiaries	1,844 (82.5)	1,844 (82.5)	1,844 (82.5)	1,482 (66.4)	1,482 (66.4)	1,482 (66.4)
Actual beneficiaries	1,162 (52.0)	1,248 (55.9)	1,655 (74.1)	1,135 (50.8)	1,208 (54.1)	1,294 (57.9)
Benefit exhaustees	20 (0.9)	99 (4.5)	175 (7.8)	104 (2.7)	183 (4.8)	258 (6.7)
All workers						
Potential beneficiaries	3,028 (79.0)	3,028 (79.0)	3,028 (79.0)	2,409 (62.8)	2,409 (62.8)	2,409 (62.8)
Actual beneficiaries	1,451 (37.9)	1,536 (40.1)	1,944 (50.7)	1,350 (35.2)	1,423 (37.1)	1,509 (39.4)
Benefit exhaustees	20 (0.9)	94 (4.2)	170 (7.6)	71 (1.9)	144 (3.8)	220 (5.8)

[a] Coverage: I — 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II — 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A — none, B — 50% reduction, C — 100% reduction.

Appendix Table 3.—Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary status: Florida.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Migrants only						
Potential beneficiaries	13,232 (96.0)	13,232 (96.0)	13,232 (96.0)	12,748 (92.5)	12,748 (92.5)	12,748 (92.5)
Actual beneficiaries	4,981 (36.2)	7,660 (55.6)	11,635 (84.4)	4,537 (32.9)	7,190 (52.2)	11,151 (80.9)
Benefit exhaustees	869 (6.3)	1,842 (13.4)	7,504 (54.4)	506 (3.7)	1,435 (10.4)	7,071 (51.3)
All workers						
Potential beneficiaries	52,826 (93.3)	52,826 (93.3)	52,826 (93.3)	49,865 (88.1)	49,865 (88.1)	49,865 (88.1)
Actual beneficiaries	16,131 (28.5)	18,810 (33.2)	22,784 (40.2)	15,256 (26.9)	17,909 (31.6)	21,870 (38.6)
Benefit exhaustees	4,682 (8.3)	5,655 (10.0)	11,317 (20.0)	4,181 (7.4)	5,111 (9.0)	10,747 (19.0)

Maine.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Migrants only						
Potential beneficiaries	749 (98.0)	749 (98.0)	749 (98.0)	749 (98.0)	749 (98.0)	749 (98.0)
Actual beneficiaries	481 (63.0)	481 (63.0)	481 (63.0)	481 (63.0)	481 (63.0)	481 (63.0)
Benefit exhaustees	18 (2.4)	18 (2.4)	18 (2.4)	18 (2.4)	18 (2.4)	18 (2.4)
All workers						
Potential beneficiaries	5,256 (52.5)	5,256 (52.5)	5,256 (52.5)	3,676 (36.7)	3,676 (36.7)	3,676 (36.7)
Actual beneficiaries	1,878 (18.8)	1,878 (18.8)	1,878 (18.8)	1,497 (15.0)	1,497 (15.0)	1,497 (15.0)
Benefit exhaustees	545 (5.4)	545 (5.4)	545 (5.4)	545 (5.4)	545 (5.4)	545 (5.4)

[a] Coverage: I — 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II — 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A — none, B — 50% reduction, C — 100% reduction.

Appendix Table 3.—Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary status: Maryland.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Migrants only						
Potential beneficiaries	1,832 (97.8)	1,832 (97.8)	1,832 (97.8)	1,608 (85.9)	1,608 (85.9)	1,608 (85.9)
Actual beneficiaries	342 (18.3)	713 (38.1)	1,282 (68.5)	264 (14.1)	501 (26.8)	1,058 (56.5)
Benefit exhaustees	34 (1.8)	34 (1.8)	147 (7.9)	34 (1.8)	34 (1.8)	69 (3.7)
All workers						
Potential beneficiaries	6,704 (84.0)	6,704 (84.0)	6,704 (84.0)	4,428 (55.5)	4,428 (55.5)	4,428 (55.5)
Actual beneficiaries	711 (8.9)	1,082 (13.6)	1,651 (20.7)	616 (7.7)	853 (10.7)	1,410 (17.7)
Benefit exhaustees	135 (1.7)	135 (1.7)	248 (3.1)	135 (1.7)	135 (1.7)	170 (2.1)

Massachusetts.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Migrants only						
Potential beneficiaries	818 (100.0)	818 (100.0)	818 (100.0)	738 (90.3)	738 (90.3)	738 (90.3)
Actual beneficiaries	153 (18.8)	153 (18.8)	560 (68.5)	117 (14.3)	117 (14.3)	480 (58.8)
Benefit exhaustees	75 (9.3)	75 (9.3)	92 (11.3)	54 (6.6)	54 (6.6)	70 (8.6)
All workers						
Potential beneficiaries	6,554 (85.2)	6,554 (85.2)	6,554 (85.2)	4,879 (63.4)	4,879 (63.4)	4,879 (63.4)
Actual beneficiaries	859 (11.2)	859 (11.2)	1,266 (16.5)	686 (8.9)	686 (8.9)	1,050 (13.7)
Benefit exhaustees	437 (5.7)	437 (5.7)	454 (5.9)	359 (4.7)	359 (4.7)	376 (4.9)

[a] Coverage: I — 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II — 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A — none, B — 50% reduction, C — 100% reduction.

Appendix Table 3. — Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary status: New Hampshire.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Migrants only						
Potential beneficiaries	144 (90.2)	144 (90.2)	144 (90.2)	140 (87.8)	140 (87.8)	140 (87.8)
Actual beneficiaries	30 (19.3)	35 (21.9)	64 (40.2)	30 (19.3)	35 (21.9)	62 (39.3)
Benefit exhaustees	2 (1.5)	2 (1.5)	11 (7.0)	2 (1.5)	2 (1.5)	11 (7.0)
All workers						
Potential beneficiaries	955 (69.7)	955 (69.7)	955 (69.7)	719 (52.5)	719 (52.5)	719 (52.5)
Actual beneficiaries	230 (16.8)	234 (17.1)	264 (19.3)	193 (14.1)	197 (14.4)	225 (16.4)
Benefit exhaustees	47 (3.5)	47 (3.5)	56 (4.1)	31 (2.3)	31 (2.3)	40 (2.9)

New Jersey.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Migrants only						
Potential beneficiaries	7,137 (90.4)	7,137 (90.4)	7,029 (89.0)	6,727 (85.2)	6,727 (85.2)	6,640 (84.1)
Actual beneficiaries	3,120 (39.5)	4,515 (57.2)	5,758 (72.9)	2,929 (37.1)	4,302 (54.5)	5,369 (68.0)
Benefit exhaustees	333 (4.2)	658 (8.3)	2,534 (32.1)	312 (4.0)	547 (29.4)	2,321 (5.4)
All workers						
Potential beneficiaries	12,506 (77.8)	12,506 (77.8)	12,398 (77.2)	10,247 (63.8)	10,247 (63.8)	10,160 (63.2)
Actual beneficiaries	4,840 (30.1)	6,235 (38.8)	7,478 (46.5)	4,294 (26.7)	5,668 (35.3)	6,735 (41.9)
Benefit exhaustees	972 (6.1)	1,298 (8.1)	3,174 (19.8)	860 (5.4)	1,095 (6.8)	2,870 (17.9)

[a] Coverage: I — 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II — 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A — none, B — 50% reduction, C — 100% reduction.

Appendix Table 3. — Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary status: New York.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Migrants only						
Potential beneficiaries	8,928 (89.6)	8,928 (89.6)	8,928 (89.6)	6,660 (66.8)	6,660 (66.8)	6,660 (66.8)
Actual beneficiaries	4,427 (44.4)	5,963 (59.8)	8,185 (82.1)	2,866 (28.8)	4,176 (41.9)	5,706 (57.2)
Benefit exhaustees	163 (1.6)	216 (2.2)	1,326 (13.3)	36 (0.4)	64 (0.7)	910 (9.1)
All workers						
Potential beneficiaries	27,829 (70.8)	27,829 (70.8)	27,829 (70.8)	19,785 (50.3)	19,785 (50.3)	19,785 (50.3)
Actual beneficiaries	7,798 (19.8)	9,334 (23.7)	11,556 (29.4)	5,364 (13.6)	6,674 (17.0)	8,204 (20.8)
Benefit exhaustees	343 (0.9)	396 (1.0)	1,506 (3.8)	216 (0.6)	244 (0.6)	1,090 (2.8)

Ohio.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Migrants only						
Potential beneficiaries	4,529 (75.6)	4,529 (75.6)	4,529 (75.6)	2,752 (45.9)	2,752 (45.9)	2,752 (45.9)
Actual beneficiaries	3,217 (53.7)	3,728 (62.2)	4,044 (47.5)	1,766 (29.5)	2,262 (37.7)	2,437 (40.7)
Benefit exhaustees	584 (9.8)	751 (12.5)	1,330 (22.2)	370 (6.2)	526 (8.8)	1,028 (17.2)
All workers						
Potential beneficiaries	15,196 (59.8)	15,196 (59.8)	15,196 (59.8)	9,970 (39.3)	9,970 (39.3)	9,970 (39.3)
Actual beneficiaries	5,582 (22.0)	6,093 (24.0)	6,409 (25.2)	3,188 (12.6)	3,683 (14.5)	3,859 (15.2)
Benefit exhaustees	370 (6.2)	526 (6.8)	1,028 (9.1)	535 (2.1)	691 (2.7)	1,193 (4.7)

[a] Coverage: I — 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II — 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A — none, B — 50% reduction, C — 100% reduction.

Appendix Table 3.—Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary status: Pennsylvania.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Migrants only						
Potential beneficiaries	2,445 (85.1)	2,445 (85.1)	2,445 (85.1)	2,119 (73.8)	2,119 (73.8)	2,119 (73.8)
Actual beneficiaries	1,164 (40.5)	1,562 (54.4)	1,895 (66.0)	982 (34.2)	1,290 (44.9)	1,568 (54.6)
Benefit exhaustees	63 (2.2)	69 (2.4)	171 (6.0)	55 (1.9)	61 (2.1)	109 (3.8)
All workers						
Potential beneficiaries	16,178 (77.9)	16,178 (77.9)	16,178 (77.9)	11,576 (73.8)	11,576 (73.8)	11,576 (73.8)
Actual beneficiaries	3,437 (16.6)	3,835 (18.5)	4,168 (20.1)	2,951 (14.2)	3,260 (15.7)	3,538 (17.0)
Benefit exhaustees	223 (1.1)	229 (1.1)	332 (1.6)	85 (0.4)	91 (0.4)	138 (0.7)

Rhode Island.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Migrants only						
Potential beneficiaries	42 (95.6)	42 (95.6)	42 (95.6)	37 (84.3)	37 (84.3)	37 (84.3)
Actual beneficiaries	21 (49.1)	21 (49.1)	21 (49.1)	21 (49.1)	21 (49.1)	21 (49.1)
Benefit exhaustees	8 (18.2)	8 (18.2)	13 (31.3)	8 (18.2)	8 (18.2)	13 (31.3)
All workers						
Potential beneficiaries	393 (69.5)	393 (69.5)	393 (69.5)	301 (53.3)	301 (53.3)	301 (53.3)
Actual beneficiaries	143 (25.4)	143 (25.4)	143 (25.4)	131 (49.1)	131 (49.1)	131 (49.1)
Benefit exhaustees	20 (3.7)	20 (3.7)	26 (4.7)	20 (3.7)	20 (3.7)	26 (4.7)

[a] Coverage: I — 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II — 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A — none, B — 50% reduction, C — 100% reduction.

Appendix Table 3.—Reduced migratory employment and beneficiary status: Vermont.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Migrants only						
Potential beneficiaries	170 (70.9)	170 (70.9)	170 (70.9)	170 (70.9)	170 (70.9)	170 (70.9)
Actual beneficiaries	9 (3.8)	9 (3.8)	54 (22.7)	9 (3.8)	9 (3.8)	54 (22.7)
Benefit exhaustees	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
All workers						
Potential beneficiaries	2,708 (68.5)	2,708 (68.5)	2,708 (68.5)	1,127 (28.5)	1,127 (28.5)	1,127 (28.5)
Actual beneficiaries	120 (3.0)	120 (3.0)	165 (4.2)	80 (2.0)	80 (2.0)	127 (3.2)
Benefit exhaustees	3 (0.1)	3 (0.1)	3 (0.1)	3 (0.1)	3 (0.1)	3 (0.1)

West Virginia

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
Migrants only						
Potential beneficiaries	463 (83.2)	463 (83.2)	463 (83.2)	382 (68.6)	382 (68.6)	382 (68.6)
Actual beneficiaries	274 (49.3)	304 (54.6)	375 (67.3)	255 (45.9)	275 (49.3)	300 (53.8)
Benefit exhaustees	18 (3.3)	18 (3.3)	37 (6.7)	18 (3.3)	18 (3.3)	18 (3.3)
All workers						
Potential beneficiaries	3,104 (77.7)	3,104 (77.7)	3,104 (77.7)	1,632 (40.9)	1,632 (40.9)	1,632 (40.9)
Actual beneficiaries	617 (15.5)	647 (16.2)	718 (18.0)	417 (10.4)	436 (10.9)	461 (11.6)
Benefit exhaustees	82 (2.1)	82 (2.1)	101 (2.6)	66 (1.7)	66 (1.7)	66 (1.7)

[a] Coverage: I — 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or a high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II — 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A — none, B — 50% reduction, C — 100% reduction.

Appendix Table 4.—Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: Connecticut.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
	Million dollars					
Migrants only						
(1) Potential benefits[b]	1.56 (100.0)	1.50 (96.2)	1.28 (82.0)	1.41 (100.0)	1.37 (97.2)	1.18 (83.7)
(2) Actual benefits[b]	.59 (100.0)	.66 (111.9)	.84 (142.4)	.51 (100.0)	.56 (109.8)	.72 (141.2)
(3) Taxable agricultural earnings	3.67 (100.0)	3.45 (94.0)	2.84 (77.4)	3.32 (100.0)	3.15 (94.9)	2.63 (79.2)
	Per cent					
(4) (2) ÷ (3) x 100[c]	16.00	19.01	29.10	15.28	17.62	26.93
	Million dollars					
All workers						
(5) Potential benefits[b]	7.81 (100.0)	7.75 (99.2)	7.53 (96.4)	6.84 (100.0)	6.80 (99.4)	6.62 (96.8)
(6) Actual benefits[b]	1.31 (100.0)	1.38 (105.3)	1.56 (119.1)	1.20 (100.0)	1.25 (104.2)	1.41 (117.5)
(7) Taxable agricultural earnings	19.44 (100.0)	19.22 (98.9)	18.61 (95.7)	16.77 (100.0)	16.60 (99.0)	16.08 (95.9)
	Per cent					
(8) (6) ÷ (7) x 100[c]	6.75	7.19	8.38	7.18	7.54	8.77

[a] Coverage. I - 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II - 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction. A - none
B - 50% reduction
C - 100% reduction

[b] Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.

[c] These may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding of the latter two.

Appendix Table 4.—Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: Delaware.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
	Million dollars					
Migrants only						
(1) Potential benefits[b]	.79 (100.0)	.74 (93.7)	.59 (74.6)	.35 (100.0)	.32 (91.4)	.22 (62.9)
(2) Actual benefits[b]	.22 (100.0)	.23 (102.2)	.22 (99.5)	.09 (100.0)	.10 (105.2)	.10 (104.2)
(3) Taxable agricultural earnings	2.25 (100.0)	2.09 (92.8)	1.64 (72.9)	1.02 (100.0)	0.95 (93.1)	0.65 (63.7)
	Per cent					
(4) (2)÷(3) x 100[c]	9.84	10.84	13.45	9.29	10.96	15.33
	Million dollars					
All workers						
(5) Potential benefits[b]	1.77 (100.0)	1.72 (97.2)	1.57 (88.7)	1.10 (100.0)	1.07 (97.3)	96.9 (88.1)
(6) Actual benefits[b]	.30 (100.0)	.30 (100.0)	.30 (100.0)	.14 (100.0)	.15 (107.1)	.15 (107.1)
(7) Taxable agricultural earnings	5.53 (100.0)	5.37 (97.1)	4.92 (89.0)	3.31 (100.0)	3.24 (97.9)	2.93 (88.5)
	Per cent					
(8) (6)÷(7) x 100[c]	5.44	5.71	6.10	4.32	4.70	5.02

[a] Coverage: I - 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more
II - 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks
Reduction: A - none
B - 50% reduction
C - 100% reduction

[b] Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.

[c] These may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding of the latter two.

Appendix Table 4.—Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: Florida.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
	Million dollars					
Migrants only						
(1) Potential benefits[b]	16.28 (100.0)	16.90 (103.8)	18.07 (111.0)	13.74 (100.0)	14.28 (103.8)	14.92 (108.5)
(2) Actual benefits[b]	1.88 (100.0)	4.78 (254.2)	12.39 (659.0)	1.44 (100.0)	4.02 (279.2)	10.2 (708.3)
(3) Taxable agricultural earnings	58.26 (100.0)	57.97 (99.5)	55.25 (94.8)	49.99 (100.0)	49.71 (99.4)	47.34 (94.7)
	Per cent					
(4) (2)÷(3) x 100[c]	3.23	8.24	22.42	2.87	8.08	21.57
	Million dollars					
All workers						
(5) Potential benefits[b]	52.01 (100.0)	52.63 (101.2)	53.81 (103.5)	47.21 (100.0)	47.75 (101.1)	48.39 (102.5)
(6) Actual benefits[b]	5.74 (100.0)	8.64 (150.5)	16.25 (283.1)	5.11 (100.0)	7.69 (150.5)	13.88 (271.6)
(7) Taxable agricultural earnings	187.71 (100.0)	187.43 (99.8)	184.70 (98.4)	171.57 (100.0)	171.29 (99.8)	168.92 (98.5)
	Per cent					
(8) (6)÷(7) x 100[c]	3.06	4.61	8.80	2.98	4.49	8.22

[a] Coverage: I - 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II - 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A - none
B - 50% reduction
C - 100% reduction

[b] Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.

[c] These may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding of the latter two.

Appendix Table 4.—Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: Maine.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
	Million dollars					
Migrants only						
(1) Potential benefits[b]	.30 (100.0)	.30 (100.0)	.32 (106.7)	.22 (100.0)	.21 (95.5)	.23 (104.5)
(2) Actual benefits[b]	.02 (100.0)	.02 (100.0)	.07 (350.0)	.01 (100.0)	.01 (100.0)	.07 (700.0)
(3) Taxable agricultural earnings	.98 (100.0)	.96 (98.0)	.96 (98.0)	.64 (100.0)	.61 (95.3)	.62 (96.7)
	Per cent					
(4) (2)÷(3) x 100[c]	2.28	2.34	7.74	2.13	2.21	10.62
	Million dollars					
All workers						
(5) Potential benefits[b]	3.59 (100.0)	3.58 (99.7)	3.61 (100.6)	1.98 (100.0)	1.97 (99.5)	1.99 (100.5)
(6) Actual benefits[b]	.20 (100.0)	.20 (100.0)	.25 (125.0)	.12 (100.0)	.12 (100.0)	.18 (150.0)
(7) Taxable agricultural earnings	11.77 (100.0)	11.75 (99.8)	11.75 (99.8)	6.45 (100.0)	6.43 (99.7)	6.43 (99.7)
	Per cent					
(8) (6)÷(7) x 100[c]	1.66	1.66	2.10	1.93	1.94	2.74

[a] Coverage: I - 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II - 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A - none
B - 50% reduction
C - 100% reduction

[b] Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.

[c] These may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding of the latter two.

Appendix Table 4.—Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: Maryland.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
	Million dollars					
Migrants only						
(1) Potential benefits[b]	1.03	1.01	.74	.66	.63	.45
	(100.0)	(98.1)	(71.8)	(100.0)	(95.5)	(68.2)
(2) Actual benefits[b]	.13	.21	.32	.04	.07	.15
	(100.0)	(161.5)	(246.2)	(100.0)	(175.0)	(375.0)
(3) Taxable agricultural earnings	3.03	2.89	1.89	2.07	1.93	1.25
	(100.0)	(95.4)	(62.4)	(100.0)	(93.2)	(60.4)
	Per cent					
(4) (2)÷(3) x 100[c]	4.38	7.11	17.01	1.79	3.27	11.76
	Million dollars					
All workers						
(5) Potential benefits[b]	5.79	5.76	5.49	3.23	3.20	3.02
	(100.0)	(99.5)	(94.8)	(100.0)	(99.1)	(93.5)
(6) Actual benefits[b]	.28	.36	.47	.18	.21	.29
	(100.0)	(128.6)	(167.9)	(100.0)	(116.7)	(161.1)
(7) Taxable agricultural earnings	17.57	17.44	16.43	9.54	9.40	8.72
	(100.0)	(99.3)	(93.5)	(100.0)	(98.5)	(91.4)
	Per cent					
(8) (6)÷(7) x 100[c]	1.61	2.04	2.87	1.93	2.23	3.37

[a] Coverage: I - 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II - 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A - none
B - 50% reduction
C - 100% reduction

[b] Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.

[c] These may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding of the latter two.

Appendix Table 4. — Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: Massachusetts.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
	Million dollars					
Migrants only						
(1) Potential benefits[b]	.50 (100.0)	.51 (102.0)	.34 (68.0)	.35 (100.0)	.36 (102.9)	.20 (57.1)
(2) Actual benefits[b]	.10 (100.0)	.13 (130.0)	.13 (130.0)	.09 (100.0)	.12 (133.3)	.12 (133.3)
(3) Taxable agricultural earnings	1.51 (100.0)	1.45 (96.0)	.94 (62.3)	1.02 (100.0)	.97 (95.1)	.50 (49.0)
	Per cent					
(4) (2)÷(3) x 100[c]	6.44	8.73	13.74	8.69	12.26	23.96
	Million dollars					
All workers						
(5) Potential benefits[b]	7.61 (100.0)	7.62 (100.1)	7.45 (97.9)	5.31 (100.0)	5.32 (100.2)	5.17 (97.4)
(6) Actual benefits[b]	.46 (100.0)	.49 (106.5)	.49 (106.5)	.38 (100.0)	.41 (107.9)	.41 (107.9)
(7) Taxable agricultural earnings	20.22 (100.0)	20.17 (99.8)	19.66 (97.23)	13.57 (100.0)	13.52 (99.6)	13.05 (96.2)
	Per cent					
(8) (6)÷(7) x 100[c]	2.29	2.44	2.52	2.81	3.04	3.15

[a] Coverage: I - 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II - 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A - none
B - 50% reduction
C - 100% reduction

[b] Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.

[c] These may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding of the latter two.

Appendix Table 4. — Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: New Hampshire.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
	Million dollars					
Migrants only						
(1) Potential benefits[b]	.04 (100.0)	.04 (100.0)	.04 (100.0)	.03 (100.0)	.03 (100.0)	.02 (66.6)
(2) Actual benefits[b]	.01 (100.0)	.01 (100.0)	.01 (100.0)	.01 (100.0)	.01 (100.0)	.01 (100.0)
(3) Taxable agricultural earnings	.16 (100.0)	.16 (100.0)	.13 (81.8)	.11 (100.0)	.11 (100.0)	.09 (81.8)
	Per cent					
(4) (2) ÷ (3) x 100[c]	3.19	3.58	8.86	4.18	4.71	12.63
	Million dollars					
All workers						
(5) Potential benefits[b]	.86 (100.0)	.86 (100.0)	.85 (98.8)	.57 (100.0)	.57 (100.0)	.56 (98.2)
(6) Actual benefits[b]	.07 (100.0)	.07 (100.0)	.07 (100.0)	.05 (100.0)	.05 (100.0)	.06 (120.0)
(7) Taxable agricultural earnings	2.43 (100.0)	2.43 (100.0)	2.40 (98.8)	1.60 (100.0)	1.60 (100.0)	1.58 (98.8)
	Per cent					
(8) (6) ÷ (7) x 100[c]	2.69	2.72	2.99	3.19	3.23	3.65

[a] Coverage: I - 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II - 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A - none
B - 50% reduction
C - 100% reduction

[b] Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.

[c] These may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding of the latter two.

Appendix Table 4. — Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: New Jersey.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
	Million dollars					
Migrants only						
(1) Potential benefits[b]	3.77 (100.0)	3.36 (89.1)	2.48 (65.8)	3.44 (100.0)	3.06 (89.0)	2.21 (64.2)
(2) Actual benefits[b]	.88 (100.0)	1.16 (131.8)	1.79 (203.4)	.76 (100.0)	1.02 (134.2)	1.58 (207.9)
(3) Taxable agricultural earnings	10.71 (100.0)	9.19 (85.8)	5.86 (54.7)	9.82 (100.0)	8.36 (85.1)	5.13 (52.2)
	Per cent					
(4) (2)÷(3) x 100[c]	8.22	12.60	30.59	7.75	12.25	30.86
	Million dollars					
All workers						
(5) Potential benefits[b]	9.66 (100.0)	9.26 (95.9)	8.38 (86.7)	7.17 (100.0)	6.79 (94.7)	5.93 (82.7)
(6) Actual benefits[b]	1.60 (100.0)	1.88 (117.5)	2.51 (156.9)	1.43 (100.0)	1.69 (118.2)	2.25 (157.3)
(7) Taxable agricultural earnings	27.25 (100.0)	25.72 (94.4)	22.39 (82.2)	20.22 (100.0)	18.77 (92.8)	15.54 (76.9)
	Per cent					
(8) (6)÷(7) x 100[c]	5.87	7.30	11.21	7.06	9.01	14.49

[a] Coverage: I - 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II - 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A - none
B - 50% reduction
C - 100% reduction

[b] Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.

[c] These may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding of the latter two.

Appendix Table 4.—Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: New York.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
	Million dollars					
Migrants only						
(1) Potential benefits[b]	4.21 (100.0)	3.74 (88.8)	2.58 (61.3)	22.93 (100.0)	22.46 (98.0)	21.30 (92.9)
(2) Actual benefits[b]	.55 (100.0)	.68 (123.6)	1.60 (290.9)	.39 (100.0)	.48 (123.1)	1.20 (307.7)
(3) Taxable agricultural earnings	14.82 (100.0)	12.86 (86.8)	6.95 (46.9)	10.46 (100.0)	8.95 (85.6)	4.58 (43.8)
	Per cent					
(4) (2)÷(3) x 100[c]	3.69	5.28	23.09	3.72	5.39	26.12
	Million dollars					
All workers						
(5) Potential benefits[b]	2.89 (100.0)	2.51 (86.9)	1.66 (57.4)	15.97 (100.0)	15.59 (97.6)	14.74 (92.3)
(6) Actual benefits[b]	1.26 (100.0)	1.39 (110.3)	2.32 (184.1)	.95 (100.0)	1.05 (110.5)	1.76 (185.3)
(7) Taxable agricultural earnings	76.05 (100.0)	74.09 (97.4)	68.18 (89.7)	50.23 (100.0)	48.71 (97.0)	44.34 (88.3)
	Per cent					
(8) (6)÷(7) x 100[c]	1.66	1.88	3.40	1.90	2.15	3.97

[a] Coverage: I - 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II - 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A - none
B - 50% reduction
C - 100% reduction

[b] Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.

[c] These may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding of the latter two.

Appendix Table 4.—Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: Ohio.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
	Million dollars					
Migrants only						
(1) Potential benefits[b]	1.41 (100.0)	1.01 (71.6)	.78 (55.3)	1.04 (100.0)	.74 (71.2)	.50 (48.1)
(2) Actual benefits[b]	.43 (100.0)	.51 (118.6)	.61 (141.9)	.26 (100.0)	.35 (134.6)	.41 (157.7)
(3) Taxable agricultural earnings	4.84 (100.0)	3.51 (72.5)	2.46 (50.8)	3.78 (100.0)	2.74 (72.5)	1.71 (45.2)
	Per cent					
(4) (2)÷(3) x 100[c]	8.80	14.43	24.93	6.75	12.73	24.08
	Million dollars					
All workers						
(5) Potential benefits[b]	10.73 (100.0)	10.33 (96.3)	10.11 (94.2)	7.32 (100.0)	7.03 (96.0)	6.79 (92.8)
(6) Actual benefits[b]	1.50 (100.0)	1.58 (105.3)	1.69 (112.7)	.80 (100.0)	.89 (111.3)	.96 (120.0)
(7) Taxable agricultural earnings	36.90 (100.0)	35.57 (93.7)	34.52 (93.6)	26.37 (100.0)	24.33 (92.3)	23.30 (88.4)
	Per cent					
(8) (6)÷(7) x 100[c]	4.08	4.45	4.90	3.15	3.67	4.10

[a] Coverage: I - 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II - 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A - none
B - 50% reduction
C - 100% reduction

[b] Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.

[c] These may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding of the latter two.

Appendix Table 4.—Reudced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: Pennsylvania.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
	Million dollars					
Migrants only						
(1) Potential benefits[b]	2.31 (100.0)	2.14 (92.6)	1.32 (57.1)	1.54 (100.0)	1.36 (88.3)	.76 (49.4)
(2) Actual benefits[b]	.31 (100.0)	.42 (135.5)	.60 (193.5)	.23 (100.0)	.29 (126.1)	.40 (173.9)
(3) Taxable agricultural earnings	6.47 (100.0)	5.90 (91.2)	3.58 (55.3)	4.10 (100.0)	3.66 (89.3)	1.99 (48.5)
	Per cent					
(4) (2)÷(3) x 100[c]	4.80	7.16	16.65	5.41	8.01	20.12
	Million dollars					
All workers						
(5) Potential benefits[b]	16.60 (100.0)	16.43 (99.0)	15.61 (94.0)	10.74 (100.0)	10.56 (98.3)	9.97 (92.8)
(6) Actual benefits[b]	.87 (100.0)	.98 (112.6)	1.16 (133.3)	.65 (100.0)	.72 (110.7)	.83 (127.7)
(7) Taxable agricultural earnings	45.97 (100.0)	45.41 (98.8)	43.09 (93.7)	28.55 (100.0)	28.02 (98.1)	26.35 (92.3)
	Per cent					
(8) (6)÷(7)x 100[c]	1.89	2.16	2.68	2.29	2.57	3.14

[a] Coverage: I - 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II - 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A - none
B - 50% reduction
C - 100% reduction

[b] Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.

[c] These may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding of the latter two.

Appendix Table 4. — Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: Rhode Island.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
	Million dollars					
Migrants only						
(1) Potential benefits[b]	.018 (100.0)	.017 (94.4)	.014 (77.8)	.017 (100.0)	.016 (94.1)	.014 (82.4)
(2) Actual benefits[b]	.01 (100.0)	.005 (50.0)	.004 (40.0)	.01 (100.0)	.005 (50.0)	.004 (40.0)
(3) Taxable agricultural earnings	.05 (100.0)	.05 (100.0)	.04 (80.0)	.05 (100.0)	.05 (100.0)	.04 (80.0)
	Per cent					
(4) (2)÷(3) x 100[c]	10.55	10.77	9.75	10.69	10.92	9.75
	Million dollars					
All workers						
(5) Potential benefits[b]	.53 (100.0)	.53 (100.0)	.53 (100.0)	.41 (100.0)	.41 (100.0)	.41 (100.0)
(6) Actual benefits[b]	.09 (100.0)	.09 (100.0)	.09 (100.0)	.09 (100.0)	.09 (100.0)	.08 (88.8)
(7) Taxable agricultural earnings	1.33 (100.0)	1.33 (100.0)	1.32 (99.2)	1.00 (100.0)	1.00 (100.0)	.99 (99.0)
	Per cent					
(8) (6)÷(7) x 100[c]	6.63	6.63	6.57	8.63	8.64	8.58

[a] Coverage: I - 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II - 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A - none
B - 50% reduction
C - 100% reduction

[b] Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.

[c] These may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding of the latter two.

Appendix Table 4. — Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: Vermont.

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
	Million dollars					
Migrants only						
(1) Potential benefits[b]	.05 (100.0)	.05 (100.0)	.04 (80.0)	.03 (100.0)	.03 (100.0)	.03 (100.0)
(2) Actual benefits[b]	.005 (100.0)	.005 (100.0)	.01 (200.0)	.001 (100.0)	.001 (100.0)	.007 (100.0)
(3) Taxable agricultural earnings	.18 (100.0)	.18 (100.0)	.15 (83.3)	.12 (100.0)	.12 (100.0)	.11 (91.7)
	Per cent					
(4) (2)÷(3) x 100[c]	2.63	2.63	7.23	.70	.70	6.60
	Million dollars					
All workers						
(5) Potential benefits[b]	2.67 (100.0)	2.67 (100.0)	2.66 (99.6)	.95 (100.0)	.95 (100.0)	.95 (100.0)
(6) Actual benefits[b]	.07 (100.0)	.07 (100.0)	.07 (100.0)	.03 (100.0)	.03 (100.0)	.04 (133.3)
(7) Taxable agricultural earnings	9.85 (100.0)	9.85 (100.0)	9.82 (99.7)	3.27 (100.0)	3.27 (100.0)	3.26 (99.7)
	Per cent					
(8) (6)÷(7) x 100[c]	0.66	0.66	0.73	1.04	1.04	1.24

[a]Coverage: I - 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II - 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A - none
B - 50% reduction
C - 100% reduction

[b]Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.

[c]These may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding of the latter two.

Appendix Table 4. — Reduced migratory employment and the added cost of unemployment insurance benefits: West Virginia

Item	Employment reduction and coverage[a]					
	I			II		
	A	B	C	A	B	C
	Million dollars					
Migrants only						
(1) Potential benefits[b]	.10 (100.0)	.09 (90.0)	.05 (50.0)	.06 (100.0)	.05 (83.3)	.03 (50.0)
(2) Actual benefits[b]	.01 (100.0)	.01 (100.0)	.02 (200.0)	.002 (100.0)	.004 (200.0)	.01 (500.0)
(3) Taxable agricultural earnings	.49 (100.0)	.43 (87.8)	.26 (53.1)	.28 (100.0)	.23 (82.1)	.11 (39.3)
	Per cent					
(4) (2)÷(3) x 100[c]	2.51	3.21	6.22	0.58	1.68	7.84
	Million dollars					
All workers						
(5) Potential benefits[b]	1.81 (100.0)	1.80 (99.4)	1.76 (97.2)	1.05 (100.0)	1.04 (99.0)	1.02 (97.1)
(6) Actual benefits[b]	.10 (100.0)	.10 (100.0)	.11 (110.0)	.04 (100.0)	.04 (100.0)	.05 (125.0)
(7) Taxable agricultural earnings	6.82 (100.0)	6.77 (99.3)	6.60 (96.8)	4.08 (100.0)	4.03 (98.8)	3.91 (95.8)
	Per cent					
(8) (6)÷(7) x 100[c]	1.48	1.52	1.60	1.25	1.40	1.78

[a] Coverage: I - 1 or more workers in 20 or more weeks or high quarterly payroll of $1500 or more.
II - 4 or more workers in 20 or more weeks.
Reduction: A - none
B - 50% reduction
C - 100% reduction

[b] Total benefits with agricultural coverage less benefits prior to agricultural coverage.

[c] These may not correspond directly to the ratio of benefits to earnings due to rounding of the latter two.

GLOSSARY

Actual Beneficiary—Any person who satisfied the monetary unemployment insurance benefit eligibility requirements and had weeks of compensable unemployment.

Actual Benefits—The amount of benefits which an individual could have withdrawn based on his earnings and employment and his weeks of compensable unemployment had unemployment insurance been in force during the survey year.

Benefit-Cost Ratio (Cost Rate)—The ratio of actual benefits to taxable covered earnings multiplied by 100.

Benefit Exhaustee—Any person who had a sufficient number of weeks of compensable unemployment to claim all of the benefits for which he was eligible as a result of his employment history.

Compensable Unemployment—All non-work categories except in-school, sick or injured, and paid vacation.

Covered Earnings — Earnings of a worker or workers for an employer who was covered by the unemployment insurance laws.

Home State — The state in which the worker had the most weeks of work.

Migrant Worker — Any person who had known earnings in more than one state during the 52 week period under consideration.

Potential Beneficiary — Any person who satisfied the monetary unemployment insurance benefit eligibility requirements.

Potential Benefits — The amount of benefits which an individual could withdraw from the fund based on his employment history if he had a sufficient number of weeks of compensable unemployment in which to claim the benefits.

Taxable Earnings — Earnings of the worker upon which the employer must pay a tax. This is the first $4200 of the worker's earnings for *each* employer.

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